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Abstract
The ability to record, store and analyse images of faces economically, rapidly and
on a vast scale brings people’s attention to privacy. The current privacy protection
approaches for face images are mainly throughmasking, blurring or black-out which,
however, removes data utilities along with the identifying information. As a result,
these ad hoc methods are hardly used for data publishing or in further researches.
The technique of de-identification attempts to remove identifying information from
a dataset while preserving the data utility as much as possible. The research on
de-identify structured data has been established while it remains a challenge to
de-identify unstructured data such as face data in images and videos. The k-Same
face de-identification was the first method that attempted to use an established
de-identification theory, k-anonymity, to de-identify a face image dataset. The
k-Same face de-identification is also the starting point of this thesis.
Re-identification risk and data utility are two incompatible aspects in face
de-identification. The focus of this thesis is to improve the privacy protection
performance of a face de-identification systemwhile providing data utility preserving
solutions for different application scenarios. This thesis first proposes the k-Same-
furthest face de-identification method which introduces the wrong-map protection
to the k-Same-M face de-identification, where the identity loss is maximised by
replacing an original face with the face that has the least similarity to it.
The data utility of face images has been considered from two aspects in this
thesis, the dataset-wise data utility such as data distribution of the data set and the
individual-wise data utility such as the facial expression in an individual image.
With the aim to preserve the diversity of a face image dataset, the k-Diff-furthest face
de-identification method is proposed, which extends the k-Same-furthest method
and can provide the wrong-map protection.
With respect to the data utility of an individual face image, the visual quality and
the preservation of facial expression are discussed in this thesis. A method to merge
the isolated de-identified face region and its original image background is presented.
The described method can increase the visual quality of a de-identified face image in
vi
terms of fidelity and intelligibility. A novel solution to preserving facial expressions
in de-identified face images is presented, which can preserve not only the category
of facial expressions but also the intensity of face Action Units.
Finally, an integration of the Active Appearance Model (AAM) and Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) is presented, which achieves the synthesis of realistic
face images with shallow neural network architectures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the development of information technology and the reduced cost of data
storage, large amount of personal information is collected. In recent years, a lot of
new equipment, such as smartphones, wearable devices and drones are expanding
the way how personal information is collected. Personal information can be easily
collected, stored, shared and even analysed as this information has great values for
business, public medical service, academic research and many more. For example,
AmazonGo achieves checkout-free stores based ondata collected by their surveillance
system; face tracking becomes the new tool for personalised advertising; and facial
expressions can be used as diagnosis information in Parkinson’s disease. However,
when such data is shared, personal information or privacy could be leaked to the
public or unauthorised parties.
People started themodern discussion on the right to privacy in late 19th century [1].
It was drafted in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the Council
of Europe in 1950. The protection of personal information or personal data was
involved in the laws in the 1990s. In 1996, the United States Congress enacted the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [2] and the HIPAA
Privacy Rule [3] was promulgated which establishes national regulations for the use
and disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI) including individuals’ medical
records and other personal health information. Meanwhile, the European Data
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) [4] was adopted in 1995, which demands
the deployment of appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect
private information in the course of transferring or processing such data. It has been
updated and replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and
of the Council, also known as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [5].
2 Introduction
Another fact is that biometric information especially face biometrics has been
widely used in access control, academic research and commercial products. It is not
only because of the recent breakthrough in computer vision which has boosted the
face recognition accuracy to the human level, but also the face data can be acquired
easily even without the coordination form the data subjects. The high performance
of the face recognition system can establish a link from a face data to the identity of
the data subject quickly and economically. However, this has led to ethical issues
when storing and using the face data. Therefore, it is necessary to have a model to
facilitate privacy-preserving use of face-related data.
There can be different approaches to preserving privacy in face (biometric)
data depending on the data use case. For example, Google Street View blurs the
pedestrians’ faces that stops a further analyse on the face region [6]; Cancellable
biometrics [7] do not register users with their real biometrics information but
scrambled or encrypted information to reduce the risk in case there is a data leak
from the biometric database. However, these methods destroy the nature/shape
of the face data and the data utility is highly downgraded so that they can barely
support any further face related analyses. Therefore, face de-identification technique
is needed to protect privacy while preserving data utility for further usage or data
publishing.
The face data are commonly collected from data subjects and released by a data
publisher. The current practice in face dataset releasing relies mostly on agreements
on the use of the published data. This approach alone may lead to insufficient
protection. Some policies and guidelines, e.g. HIPAA Privacy Rule, limit the
distribution of face data, which make it hard for researchers to have enough data
to model the real-world scenario. Academics have proposed two models for using
personal information in a database [8]:
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) [9]
In this model, the original data are not released, but the results extracted from
the original data through data mining are released. The released results need
to be accurate and the model should provide a reconstruction procedure that
can estimate the distribution of the original data.
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) [10]
This model aims to provide data that have high utility without revealing
the identity of the data subjects. The published data are processed with
3de-identification or synthetic data generation methods. With such data, other
researchers could perform novel analyses.
These two privacy-preserving models have been investigated and applied to
structured data [11]. However, challenges remain for preserving privacy with
unstructured data such as visual data. “A big difference between ordinary data
privacy and video data privacy is the amorphous nature of the latter and the difficulty
in processing it automatically to extract useful information” [12]. In other words,
preserving privacy in visual data requires the algorithm to detect, segment and
extract target information precisely. Thanks to the development of machine learning
techniques more and more approaches have been proposed to preserve privacy in
unstructured data [8], [13].
Research in de-identification aims to not only protect privacy in the de-identified
data but also maintain the utility of data. The early approaches to face de-
identification are called ad hoc face de-identification because their primary purpose
is to hide the identity information in the image while the preservation of the data
utility is not considered in the design. The k-Same face de-identification method is
the first attempt that applied k-anonymity to face data. Its variants k-Same-Select and
model-based k-Same (k-Same-M) have been proposed to improve the preservation
of data utility and intelligibility of the de-identified face image respectively. More
face de-identification methods are introduced in Chapter 2.
Themodel-based k-Same is the basis of the facede-identification systemsproposed
in this thesis. The proposed face de-identification methods attempt to further reduce
the re-identification risk of the k-Same-Mmethod, as well as preserve the data utility
of the de-identified face data. Its key technique is manipulating the face data in
the face feature space and reconstructing synthetic faces as the de-identified faces.
It can adapt to different use cases and preserve specific data utilities. The data
utilities are discussed in this thesis including the diversity of a face dataset, facial
expressions in image and video data. An end-to-end face de-identification system
for both closed-set and open-set is proposed in this thesis. This thesis also discusses
that the de-identified face data should have the nature of a face data and proposes
a method that can guarantee the de-identified face image’s visual quality in terms
of the fidelity and the intelligibility. The proposed face de-identification system is
intelligible to both human vision and existing computer vision system, because the
realistic de-identified face image is accepted by a human observer and can be used
directly in existing face related computer vision system as input.
4 Introduction
1.1 Contributions
This thesis addresses several limitations of the existing face de-identificationmethods
and makes following contributions to the research field of face de-identification:
• A novel k-Same-furthest face de-identification method introducing the wrong-
map protection to the model-based k-Same face de-identification to further
reduce the one-to-one re-identification risk (see Chapter 4);
• Another low-risk face de-identification method, k-Diff-furthest, which is modi-
fied from k-Same-furthest with the aim of maintaining the data diversity in the
de-identified face dataset (see Chapter 5);
• An approach to merging the isolated de-identified faces with their original
backgrounds to increase both fidelity and intelligibility of the de-identified
face images for human observer in real-world applications (see Chapter 6);
• Evaluation of the re-identification risk caused by the image background and
demonstrate the high risk of potential attacks using information in the image
background (see Chapter 6);
• A novel Facial Expression Transfer (FET) process which has been combined
with face de-identification to preserve the data utility of facial expressions. It
can map the facial expressions from an original face image to its de-identified
face image. Furthermore, it can also be used to preserve the head motions in
the video frames (see Chapter 7);
• Introduce the identity pool to face de-identification, which is a set of person-
specific neutral frontal face images playing the role of identity references. The
identity pool can help to adapt the closed-set face de-identification methods to
open-set face de-identification (see Chapter 7 and 8);
• An application of end-to-end face de-identification in video sequences, which
combines all the above-mentioned contributions, including de-identification for
face image dataset, FET, identity shift and backgroundmerging (see Chapter 7);
• A novel approach to synthesising realistic-looking face image using the face
appearance model and the Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) (see Chap-
ter 8);
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• Anapplication of using the proposed appearancemodel-basedGAN to generate
the identity pool for face de-identification. To this end, cascaded filters for
selecting frontal neutral faces is proposed (see Chapter 8).
1.2 Research outputs
• L.Meng and Z. Sun, “Face De-identification with perfect privacy protection,” in
Proceedings of the 37th International Convention on Information and Communication
Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), 2014, pp. 1234–1239.
(Chapter 4)
• Z. Sun, L. Meng, and A. Ariyaeeinia, “Distinguishable de-identified faces,” in
Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference and Workshops on Automatic
Face and Gesture Recognition (FG), 2015, vol. 04, pp. 1–6. (Chapter 5)
• Z. Sun, L. Meng, A. Ariyaeeinia, X. Duan, and Z.-H. Tan, “Privacy protection
performance of De-identified face images with and without background,” in
Proceedings of the 39th International Convention on Information and Communication
Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), 2016, pp. 1354–1359.
(Chapter 6)
• L.Meng, Z. Sun, A.Ariyaeeinia, andK. L. Bennett, “Retaining expressions on de-
identified faces,” in Proceedings of the 37th International Convention on Information
and Communication Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), 2014,
pp. 1252–1257. (Chapter 7)
• L. Meng, Z. Sun, and O. Collado, “Efficient approach to de-identifying faces
in videos,” IET Signal Process., vol. 11, no. 9, pp. 1039–1045, Dec. 2017.
(Chapter 7)
6 Introduction
1.3 Thesis outline
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews and compares various de-
identification methods with a focus on the methods developed for face images.
Chapter 3 reviews research advances related to this thesis, including face appearance
model, facial landmark detection methods, face recognition methods and the ap-
proaches to facial expression synthesis. Chapter 4 presents the k-Same-furthest face
de-identification method which introduces the wrong-map protection to the model-
based k-Same face de-identification. Chapter 5 proposes the k-Diff-furthest face
de-identification method which aims to maintain the diversity of the de-identified
face image dataset. Chapter 6 discusses the data utility and the re-identification
risk of the original image background in the face de-identification. An approach to
merging the de-identified face region to its original background as well as a potential
attack using the background information are presented. Chapter 7 presents an
approach to map the facial attribute changes to a de-identified face including facial
expression transfer, identity shift and headmotion transfer between video frames. An
end-to-end approach to face de-identification in videos is also presented in Chapter 7.
Chapter 8 introduces the Appearance Model-based GAN for face image generation
and presents the training strategies for with/without facial attribute conditions. The
generated face images are integrated with the proposed face de-identification system
and the face de-identification performance are presented.
Chapter 2
Background
The concepts ofde-identificationhavebeenwell established for tabulardata, especially
health data records [8], [11], [14], [15]. The research in health data de-identification
shares concepts and has inspired the investigation of de-identification in other
types of data including de-identification in multimedia data [13]. Section 2.1 briefly
introduces the existing de-identification methods on structured data, and the other
sections of this chapter present a review of the latest research in face de-identification
and the commonly adopted techniques.
2.1 De-identification on structured data
In de-identification literature [8], [10], [14], [16], [17], the attributes of a data record
are divided into two categories, namely direct identifiers and quasi-identifiers (or
indirect identifier). The direct identifiers can be directly used to identify individuals,
for example, name, phone number, social security number, etc. Quasi-identifiers
are the identifiers which hardly identify an individual when being used alone but
can be linked with other information to identify a record, for example, date of birth,
postcode, gender, etc. Sweeney demonstrated a re-identification attack achieved by
linking shared attributes (quasi-identifiers) cross datasets [17]. Direct identifiers can
be anonymised by masking techniques, and quasi-identifiers by de-identification
methods [16]. Here are some commonly used data anonymisation methods:
Data masking
Data masking could be achieved by applying partial data removal or data quarantin-
ing. Partial data removal, especially the removal of direct personal identifiers [8], is
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the most common and a necessary approach to reducing the re-identification risk.
Data quarantining technique is usually applied to a controllable environment where
a trusted data recipient is unlikely or unable to gain access to the other data needed
to facilitate re-identification.
Data masking is a relatively high-risk technique because the anonymised data
still exists in an individual-level form.
Pseudonymisation
In pseudonymisation, a coded reference or pseudonym is attached to a record to
allow the data to be associated with an individual without the individual being
identified. If multiple records are linked, to support certain types of data analysis,
the same original values are always replaced by the same pseudonym, and it is called
deterministic modification.
The same as data masking, data anonymised by pseudonymisation exists in an
individual-level form and hence has a relatively high-risk.
Aggregation
Generally speaking, aggregation technique replaces original data with their totals,
so no data identifying an individual remains after de-identification. Depending on
the data type or the statistical characteristics of the data, different settings need to be
considered to preserve data utility. In real-world applications, several variants can
be employed, e.g. inference control, rounding, sampling, synthetic data, etc.
Aggregation techniques are relatively low-risk techniques because it is difficult to
associate an aggregated data with an individual. Aggregated data cannot support
individual-level research but can be sufficient for analysing social trends on a regional
basis.
One of the microaggregation approaches named k-anonymity [17], also known
as k-partition [11], has been proposed to anonymise quasi-identifiers. It has also
provided theoretical support to the k-Same face de-identification method. Partition
and aggregation are carried out in the process of k-anonymity. Each partition
contains at least k records which they are clustered based on similarity. Then the
k records are replaced by their average, so that if the source records are matched
against the de-identified data, there will be at least k de-identified records having the
same similarities. ℓ-diversity [18] adds requirements for diversity of the sensitive
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attributes within each class to k-anonymity. Later, t-closeness [19] requires that the
de-identified data are statistically close to the original data.
Derived data items and banding
Banding produces coarser-grained descriptions of the source data. The derived data
are values that reflect some higher-level characteristics of the source data. In most
cases, this is a “summary” of the source data, e.g. using partial postcode or replacing
a date of birth by its year or the age.
Banding is a relatively low-risk technique because it is hard to establish one-to-
one matching between the derived data and the source data. Nevertheless, certain
individual-level analysis can be done with the derived data.
Data swapping
Data swapping exchanges certain parts of a record with the corresponding parts
of another record. It adds uncertainty to the links between the identities and
the records without changing data distribution. Several factors can affect the de-
identification level, including selection of swapping candidates, similarity among
swapping attributes and swapping rate [20].
2.2 Ad hoc face de-identification
According to HIPAA Privacy Rule Safe Harbor standard [3], face image data must
be removed from a health dataset.1 However, datasets used in some application
such as facial expression analysis and surveillance-based systems only contain
images/videos of human faces. In such cases, the only task is to de-identify the face
instances in the dataset.
Ad hoc face de-identification is the method which applies image processing
techniques to a source imagewith the aim to blur or distort the identifying information
in the image. The motivation of these ad hoc methods is to prevent the target
faces being recognised by human or machines. The research of ad hoc face de-
identification focuses on improving the face detection techniques and designing
a better image masking technique to satisfy specific purposes [6], [21]–[23]. Ad
hoc methods have been wildly used in anonymising photos of public-oriented
1 TheHIPAA Privacy Rule Safe Harbor standard lists 18 specific identifiers including “(P) Biometric
identifiers, including finger and voice prints; (Q) Full face photographs and any comparable images.”
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scenes, e.g. images/videos used in news and street view photos. In these scenarios,
the removal of facial information does not affect too much to the storytelling or
the expression of the key information. Comparing to other face de-identification
techniques, these methods are ad hoc because they did not consider much about the
unique characteristics of human faces in the design.
Ad hoc face de-identification usually starts with a face detection process. The
detected face area is then processed by one of the following methods [24]:
Blurring.
Apply a 2D convolution to the image with a flat kernel or a Gaussian kernel.
The kernel size and the standard deviation σ of the Gaussian kernel are usually
used to control the de-identification performance.
Pixilation.
Slide a pixel block across the image, strip size = block size. The average value
replaces the original pixel values in the block. The block size is used to control
the de-identification performance.
Censor bar.
Cover part of the face area with a bar-shaped or T-shaped single colour pattern.
Usually, censor bar covers only the region of eyes as shown in Fig. 2.1d. There
is no parameter in this method, but the area of the censor bar can be used to
measure the de-identification performance. When the bar area equals to the
detected face area, the particular method is named blackout, which removes all
the information in the detected area.
Random noise.
Choose random pixel locations and replace the values in each colour channel
with a random value between 0 and 255. The probability of whether change
the value(s) of a pixel location or not is set to control the performance of
de-identification.
Threshold.
Set all the pixel values to 0 or 255 depending on a threshold value. The
threshold value is the parameter to control the de-identification performance.
It can be either an integer value between 0 and 255 or an intensity value between
0 and 1.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 2.1 Ad hoc face de-identification examples. (a) original face region detected by
Viola and Jones face detector [26]; (b) blurring with Gaussian filter; (c) pixelation; (d)
censor bar; (e) random noise; (f) threshold.
Warping.
Warping is yet another image processing technique which can distort informa-
tion in images. It has been mentioned in [7], [25], but it is rarely seen in practice.
A set of selected key points are shifted randomly to obtain the transformation
matrix. There are relatively more parameters in this method. The maximum
shift distance of the key points is one of the parameters used to control the
de-identification level. The warping process is revisable, so the original image
can be re-generated when the de-identification level is low.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates some common ad hoc face de-identification methods. The
advantage of these methods is their operands are pixels, and they only rely on face
detection techniques, so they are easy to implement and could be highly automatic.
However, they have few disadvantages on both re-identification risk and data utility
folds. In terms of preservation of data utility, they are destructive. Most of the ad
hoc face de-identification methods treat each pixel equally. As a result, they tend to
destroy the utility of the image data for the purpose of reducing the re-identification
risks. For example, the facial expression becomes undistinguishable when a high
level of de-identification is implemented. They can even make de-identified images
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lost the nature of face images so that a face detection software cannot detect faces
from such de-identified images. Automatic face detection is the first step of the most
face-related analysis. If the face in a de-identified face image fails to be detected, then
it is hard to use this image for further analysis, unless the data publisher provides
the face detection boundary boxes or facial landmarks. A face detection test is shown
below to compare the data utility of de-identified face image for three popular face
detection frameworks with their default settings:
• OpenCV face detector is an implementation of Viola-Jones detection, which is
a Haar feature-based cascade classifiers [26]. OpenCV provides several trained
models. In the following test, the model haarcascade_frontalface_alt.xml
was used.
• Dlib provides a face detector which trained with HOG features combined with
linear Support Vector Machine (SVM). It is another popular object detection
proposed by Dalal et al. [27].
• MTCNN is a relatively new face detector. It cascades three Convolutional
Neural Networks to conduct a coarse-to-fine face detection [28]. It is more
robust in the head pose, illumination and tiny size face than previous two face
detectors.
962 frontal faces from FERET data are used in this face detection test. Fig. 2.2
shows the success detection rate and de-identification examples of a face image are
shown in Fig. 2.3. The results show that the success detection rates are decreasing
when the protection levels are increasing. Face detectors are not sensitive to blur,
while pixelation, random noise, threshold and blackout methods can make the face
detectors fail to detect faces in the de-identified images when protection levels are
increasing.
In terms of reducing re-identification risk, these ad hoc methods may fail to
serve their goal of privacy protection. Because the image processing techniques in
these methods are easy to re-implement, attackers can use parrot attack to crack
the de-identification settings. For details of parrot attack (see Chapter 6). It has
been demonstrated in [24], [29], [30] that the re-identification risk of face images
de-identified by bar masking or pixelation is 100%. Recent research shows that a
deep neural network with Variational Autoencoder (VAE) or GAN architecture has
the ability to restore a blurred face image or obscured face images [31]–[33].
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Fig. 2.2 Face detection rates on the de-identified face images with ad hoc methods
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Fig. 2.3 Examples of face detection on de-identified face images with ad hoc methods,
where the example image is from FERET dataset [34].
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2.3 k-Same face de-identification
k-Same and its variants implement k-anonymity de-identification to a face dataset.
Here are some definitions commonly used in the context of k-Same face de-
identification.
Definition 2.1 (Face Set). A face set is a set of m face images {I i : I i ∈ Rh×w×c , i 
1, . . . ,m} with height h, width w and c colour channels.
Definition 2.2 (Person-Specific Face Set). LetH be a face set of m images {I1, . . . , Im}.
H is person-specific if and only if each person has only one image in the set H and
each I ∈ H relates to only one person.
Definition 2.3 (k-anonymity on Face Images). Given a person-specific face set H, a
set of de-identified face images Hd, |H | > 1, a de-identification function f : H → Hd.
If for each I ∈ H there exists Id ∈ Hd where f (I)  Id and for each Id ∈ Hd, there
are at least k identical copies of Id ∈ Hd, then Hd adheres to k-anonymity. It is said
that Hd is k-anonymised over H.
2.3.1 k-Same
Ad hoc methods operate at the pixel level and provide privacy protection through
blurring (or completely black out) image pixels. However, when applying face
de-identification to an image set, privacy protection can be achieved by aggregat-
ing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) through a k-anonymity process. The
k-anonymity based face de-identification methods are able to maintain the original
resolution of the face and hence provide a valid foundation for data utility preser-
vation. k-Same [24] method is the first face de-identification method, which was
designed to operate on a person-specific face set.
In k-Same, the original face set is divided into clusters of size k. Each of the k
records in a cluster is replaced/de-identified by the centroid of its cluster so that
the k-Same face de-identification method could achieve k-anonymity. k-Same face
de-identification can apply microaggregation on either face image pixels or their
Eigenface features. Details of the k-Same method are described in Algorithm 1.
The outcomes of the k-Same method depend on its clustering result. The optimal
clustering solution leads to the minimal information loss, i.e. the minimum data
utility loss in the de-identified dataset. Because when the members in a cluster are
closer to each other geometrically the cluster centroid becomesmore representative of
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Algorithm 1: k-Same pixel/Eigen
input :Person-specific face set H : {x}, where x is a vector of pixel values or
image PCA features; Privacy constant k, with |H | ≥ k.
output :De-identified face set Hd.
1 Hd ←  ;
2 for ∃x ∈ H do
3 if |H | < 2k then
4 k ← |H | ;
5 end
6 {x1, . . . , xk} ← kNN(H, x , k); // k-Nearest Neighbours
7 x¯ ← 1k
∑k
m1 xm ;
8 Add k copies of x¯ to Hd ;
9 H ← H \ {x1, . . . , xk} ;
10 end
Algorithm 2:MDAV-generic for face de-identification
input :Person-specific face set H : {x}, where x is a vector of pixel values or
image PCA features; Privacy constant k, with |H | ≥ k.
output :De-identified face set Hd
1 Hd ←  ;
2 while |H | ≥ 3k do
3 x¯ ← 1|H |
∑
x , ∀x ∈ H ;
4 Find the most distant record x(1)r to x¯ ;
5 Find the most distant record x(1)s from the record x
(1)
r ;
6 {x(1)r , . . . , x(k)r } ← kNN(H, xr, k); // k-Nearest Neighbours
7 H ← H \ {x(1)r , . . . , x(k)r } ;
8 {x(1)s , . . . , x(k)s } ← kNN(H, xs, k);
9 H ← H \ {x(1)s , . . . , x(k)s } ;
10 end
11 if |H | ≥ 2k then
12 x¯ ← 1|H |
∑
x , ∀x ∈ H ;
13 find the most distant record xr from x¯ ;
14 {x(1)r , . . . , x(k)r } ← kNN(H, xr, k);
15 form another cluster containing the rest of records;
16 else
17 form a new cluster with the remaining records;
18 end
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Fig. 2.4 Re-identification risk on toy data
the cluster members. It has shown that the optimal solution to the microaggregation
is an NP-hard problem [35], [36]. However, k-Same algorithm is not designed to
find the optimal partition of the input data. In most cases, the face image data has
a near Gaussian distribution. Hence, in k-Same, the random selected clustering
seed x have a high probability to be in a high-density neighbourhood. As a result,
a “hole” often appears in the data space after several iterations. This will make
the centroids of later formed clusters lose the ability to represent and maintain the
data utility of their members (see Fig. 2.5a). MDAV-generic [37] is a near-optimal
solution to microaggregation, which also satisfies k-anonymity. At each iteration,
the method forms clusters with the two records that have the largest distance to
the average of all records. As a result, the records which are far from other records
have a higher priority to be processed and “hole” in data/feature space are avoided.
A comparison of k-Same and MDAV-generic is shown in Fig. 2.4 and 2.5. The toy
dataset used in this comparison study was randomly generated with N (x; µ, Σ)
where µ 
[
0
0
]
and Σ 
[
1 1
1 3
]
. As shown in Fig. 2.4, the re-identification risks of
both methods are lower than 1/k. The re-identification risk of MDAV-generic is
closer to the theoretical upper bound 1/k, which means MDAV-generic gives more
expected partition results. The cluster centroids are more representative of its own
cluster members than members in the other clusters.
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Fig. 2.5 The clustering results of k-Same and MDAV-generic. The cluster index
numbers are displayed at the locations of their cluster centroids. In (a), the highlighted
records of cluster 9 and cluster 10 are far from their cluster centroids. It is obvious
that after the formation of clusters 1, 5, 6 and 8, there is a “hole” in the data/feature
space. Cluster 9 can only take the remaining records and thus spans over many
existing clusters.
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A face image contains various data utility information, e.g. genders, face shapes,
expressions and age. k-Same de-identification is normally applied to the face images
directly after face detection without any furthest analysis. Although k-Same face
de-identification could guarantee a re-identification risk of de-identified faces lower
than 1/k, the data utility information is often lost along with the aggregation. There
are several limitations of applying microaggregation on pixels or their Eigenface
parameters directly, including: (a) loss of data utility; (b) ghost artefacts on the
de-identified images (see Fig. 2.6); and (c) limited privacy protection.
2.3.2 Model-based k-Same
One of the limitations of k-Same de-identification is visual quality in the sense that the
de-identified faces may have ghost artefacts on them. The cause of this problem is the
misalignment among faces when calculating their mean. Automatic face alignment
is a general problem in face recognition [38], and the state-of-the-art solution is based
on the annotations of the facial landmarks. Facial landmarks can be detected by
a regression model such as Active Appearance Model (AAM), Constrained Local
Model (CLM) [39] and Constrained Local Neural Fields (CLNF) [40]. In 2006,
Gross et al. [30] proposed model-based face de-identification, namely k-Same-M,
which is an integration of AAM and their previous face de-identification work. The
experimental results showed that the k-Same-M de-identification offers a similar
protection performance as k-Same, i.e. a re-identification risk lower than 1/k, while
generating de-identified faces with a much better visual quality (see Fig. 2.6). In
k-Same-M, a statistical appearance model [30], [41], [42] is used to represent the
faces. The same model has been used in the rest of this thesis. This appearance
model contains a shape representation and a texture representation. The shape of a
face is defined by its facial landmarks, and the face texture is the mean-shaped face
appearances which are warped from the pixels inside its face shape. For the details
of the appearance model (see Section 3.1).
2.3.3 k-Same variants for utility preservation
Microaggregation in pixel/Eigenface space not only aggregates the identity infor-
mation but also other face attributes such as facial expressions. Gross et al. [29]
demonstrated that ad hoc methods fail to preserve data utility at high obfuscation
levels. To integrate data utility to the de-identified face images, they proposed the
k-Same-Select face de-identification method [29]. k-Same-Select applies data utility
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(a) k-Same (b) k-Same-M
Fig. 2.6 Face de-identification examples of k-Same and k-Same-M [30]. The original
face shows on the left and the de-identified face on the right. The k value in both
examples is 10. There are some heavy ghost artefacts shown in the result of k-Same.
(a) k-Same
(b) k-Same-Select
Fig. 2.7 Comparison of data utility of smiling between k-Same and k-Same-Select
(adapted from [29])
classifiers on the original image dataset to divide it into subsets. The face images
in each subset have the same or similar data utility so that the de-identified faces
maintain the expected data utility after applying the k-Same face de-identification
process on each subset (see Fig. 2.7).
In [43], Gross et al. mentioned three types of mapping mechanism for face
de-identification, i.e.
ϵ-map can be described as “make the de-identified face look like no one”.
wrong-map can be described as “make the de-identified face look like someone else”.
(k , ϵ)-map can be described as “make the de-identified face look like everyone”.
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They also pointed out that k-Same face de-identification was designed for a closed
dataset. However, in the real-word scenario, the subject to be de-identified is not
always in the dataset. Even though the subject is in the dataset, the illumination
and expression variant can be different from his/her reference in the dataset. Later,
a multi-factor models for face de-identification was proposed by Gross et al. [44],
[45]. The framework combined linear, bilinear and quadratic data models. It is a
generative multi-factor model which is able to factorise the face image into identity
and non-identity factors. The de-identification then be applied to the combined
factors. Experiments showed that this algorithm protects privacy while preserving
data utility on an expression variant face dataset.
Du et al. proposed GARP-Face framework with an aim to preserve specific facial
attributes including, gender, age and race of the original faces [46]. Their approach
preserves the data utility in a way similar to k-Same-select. A reference face gallery
is required and, the gallery is divided into several subsets based on the combination
of the attributes, then the utility-specific AAMs are trained on each subset. The
de-identified face is an aggregated face computed within each subset, which satisfies
k-anonymity. Experiments show that GARP-Face outperforms the general AAM
approach.
Attribute preserved face de-identification (APFD) was proposed by Jourabloo et
al. [47]. This work extended the work of k-Same-M, and added attribute classifiers
to preserve data utility. The main novelty of this work is that the de-identified face
is not the average of k faces but a weighted sum of k faces. The initial weights of
shape parameters and texture parameters are 1/k, then the weights are optimised
by gradient descent to minimise a joint objective function, which is constituted by
a term of attribute classification error and a term of face verification likelihood.
Experiments showed that with the same k value APFD has a lower re-identification
risk than k-Same-M.
Most recently, Meden et al. used generative neural network (GNN) to generate
synthesised faces to de-identify face images [48]. The GNN is controllable to generate
a face image with given facial attributes. Later, this GNN face de-identification
pipeline was extended with the idea of k-anonymity and became k-Same-Net [49].
Different from the above mentioned k-Same family, this approach involves a proxy
image set which is a set of the face images used to train the GNN. First, a one-to-
one correspondence was established between a cluster of k faces from the input
image set and the images in the proxy set. The identity vector for GNN was then
calculatedwith the k corresponding faces in the proxy set. To preserve the expression
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information, the non-identity-related parameters for GNN were computed from the
input images. Because the identity-related information of the de-identified faces
are synthesised from the proxy set (the GNN training set) through the GNN, the
re-identification risks are close to random matching no matter what k value is. To
train such a decoder-like neural network with a good understanding of latent space
is challenging. Image generation is a hot research topic and later proposed image
generation models can improve the image quality of the GNN.
2.4 Other face de-identification approaches
In [50], AAM was adopted to de-identify faces in different poses. First, AAM fitting
obtains the face shapes, and then the face appearance was used to search in a frontal
face gallery to find the proper candidates for face swapping. The method was named
q-far, where the q denotes the rank of similarity to the input face. This approach
trades-off between visual quality and re-identification risk. If the similarity of the
candidate is too close to the original face, the de-identified face looks natural, but
the re-identification risk is high. Otherwise, if the candidate is too different from the
original face, it will make the de-identified face have lower naturalness but higher
security level. Thus, a large candidate gallery was suggested when applying this
approach. In the same year, we proposed a facial expression transfer approach to
achieve preservation of facial expressions and also to address the different head pose
problem in face de-identification [51].
Apart from using AAMs, other approaches were proposed to de-identify face
images. In 2014, Mosaddegh et al. [52] proposed a face de-identification approach
aiming to preserve the visual quality of output images while reducing the re-
identification risk. In their approach, based on the results of facial landmark
detection, the face was segmented into four facial components, namely, eyebrow,
eye, nose & cheek and mouth & chin. Each component is then replaced with the
same component from a donor. Four different donors are used to replace the four
components on an original face. Each de-identified face generated by this method is
an aggregation of four different faces and hence presents a low re-identification risk.
Letournel et al. [53] extended the ad hoc blurring method and applied different
blurring levels to individual face regions to better preserve target facial expression.
It relied on the facial landmark detection technique, and a weights map for each
pixel was computed using a variational model based on the facial landmarks. The
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face regions that contribute more to emotional analysis, e.g. eyes, gaze, lips, etc. will
be given a reduced blurring level.
In [54], Chriskos et al. discussed two de-identification methods that could fail the
machine but not human. The first method extracts face features through Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD), and then the SVD coefficients are manipulated to
achieve face de-identification. The second method normalises the face projections to
have the same distance to their mean vector so that all the face projections lie on the
surface of a hypersphere. Because face alignment did not involve in this work, ghost
artefacts appeared on the de-identified faces. The visual quality cannot compete
with model-based approaches.
In [55],wepointedout that soft- andnon-biometric identifiers, e.g. hair colour/style,
ears, clothing, etc. could also significantly increase the re-identification risk. Later,
Brkić et al. proposed a face de-identification system to address on face, hairstyle and
clothing colour [56]. In their system, the face area is segmented from the background.
Based on the face detection and segmentation information, a synthetic face generated
by DCGAN is used to replace the original face, and a segmented hairstyle image
then is put on the image to replace the original hair. Finally, a clothing/background
recolour scheme is used to preserve the skin colour while altering the colour of the
clothing.

Chapter 3
Related work
3.1 Face appearance models
In all the work presented in this thesis, statistical appearance models have been
used as the face representation model. This section starts with an introduction to
principal component analysis, which is the key technique in the AAM framework for
dimension reduction. The section then moves on to a mathematical description of
the appearance models.
3.1.1 Principal component analysis
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is an important algorithm in modern
data analysis. It is non-parametric, and it is categorised to unsupervised learning
in machine learning field. PCA is an effective way to reduce a complex dataset to
a lower dimension to reveal the simplified data structures. The process of PCA is
guided by the assumptions including linearity, the large variances have important
structure and the principal components are orthogonal.
PCA can be solved by eigenvector decomposition or SVD. Consider a zero-mean
dataset X , represented as an m × n matrix, and its covariance matrix
CX 
1
n − 1XX
⊤. (3.1)
According to the assumptions, the principal componentsP ofX can be found through
Y  PX with the condition that CY  1n−1YY
⊤ is a diagonal matrix. It is proved
that P diagonalises CY if P is the transpose of eigenvectors of CX . Furthermore, the
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eigenvectors are re-ordered depending on their eigenvalues λ so that large variances
have importance structure and lower variances represent noise.
SVD is a powerful factorisationmethodwhich converts any arbitrary n×mmatrix
A to two orthogonal matrices and a diagonal matrix.
A  UΣV⊤ (3.2)
where U is an n × n orthogonal matrix, V is an m × m orthogonal matrix which
is the eigenvectors of A⊤A, and Σ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal is the
singular values of A. V is ordered so that the corresponding eigenvalues λ satisfy
λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn ≥ 0. Furthermore, the diagonal entries of Σ are singular values
σi 
√
λi . It is intimately related to PCA, so the principal components of X can be
solved by SVD. Let
A 
1√
n − 1X
⊤ (3.3)
imply that
A⊤A  1
n − 1XX
⊤
 CX (3.4)
Therefore, V is the eigenvectors of CX , and its columns are the principal components
of X . The first few principal components could retain majority variance of X .
k∑
i1
λi ≥ (1 − ϵ)
m∑
i1
λi , 1 ≤ k ≤ m; 0 ≤ ϵ ≤ 1, (3.5)
Xˆ 
[
p1, p2, . . . , pk
]
Y , Y 
[
p1, p2, . . . , pk
]⊤
X , (3.6)
where p i ∈ Rm is the ith principal component of X and k is the number of principal
components to retain a certain amount of variance. In other words, x i in X could
be represented by k PCA parameters approximately (3.6). This is the reason why
PCA can achieve dimension reduction. Fig. 3.1 shows that in a face model, the
top 10 principal components can maintain more than 95% variance of the shape
information.
3.1.2 Statistical models for face appearance
Statistical face appearance models are widely used in face image editing, face
synthesis, face alignment and face de-identification [30], [57]–[59]. Recently, this
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Fig. 3.1 PCA variances of face shape models used in following experiments.
model has been used to decode face appearance from neural population responses
in the primate brain [60]. It is a linear model consisting of a model of face shape
variances, Point Distribution Model (PDM) [61], and a model of shapeless facial
texture variances. The shape s is defined by n facial landmarks. Then a facial triangle
mesh can be constructed with the shape points (see Fig. 3.2). The facial landmarks
are annotated manually or detected automatically by algorithms. The techniques to
detect facial landmarks are introduced in the next section.
s 
[
x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . , xn , yn
]⊤ ∈ R2n . (3.7)
Applying PCA to a training set of s, we obtain the eigenvectorsΦs ∈ R2n×ks and
eigenvalues λs ∈ Rks . We use a proportion of the total variation of λ to decide the
number of components ks . The model represents a given shape s as
sˆ  s¯ +Φsα, (3.8a)
α  Φ⊤s (s − s¯) , (3.8b)
where s¯ is the mean shape and α ∈ Rks is the shape parameters.
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Fig. 3.2 Face shape of 111 triangles defined by 68 vertices. This 68 facial landmark
scheme is the most popular facial landmark scheme, which was used in CMU
Multi-PIE [62] and IBUG 300-W [63] datasets.
The shapeless texture t ∈ R3m is a vector of m pixel values which is obtained
by warping all the pixels inside a convex hull around s to the mean shape s¯. The
image warping process applies piecewise affine warp on each triangle in the triangle
mesh. The same as shape, PCA is applied to a set of t to obtain the texture principal
componentsΦt ∈ R3m×kt and eigenvalues λt ∈ Rkt . A given texture t is represented
in the model as
tˆ  t¯ +Φtβ, (3.9a)
β  Φ⊤t (t − t¯) , (3.9b)
where t¯ is the mean texture and β ∈ Rkt is the texture parameters.
Semantic meanings are observed in the first several principal components in both
shape models and texture models (see Fig. 3.3 and 3.4). These semantic meanings
are used in the pre-processing stage of face de-identification process. To keep the
shape model parameters and texture model parameters separate, shape parameters
and texture parameters are merely concatenated to construct appearance parameters
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Fig. 3.4 Face texture models
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(a) w/o glasses, moustache (b) w/ glasses (c) w/ glasses, moustache
Fig. 3.5 The comparison of original faces and their reconstructed faces from the corre-
sponding appearance model parameters. Original face on the left and reconstructed
face on the right.
without further reduction.1 Shape parameters and texture parameters have different
units. To make α and β commensurate, weights need to apply to one set of the
parameters. The choice of parameter weights has been discussed in [41], and it
suggests a simple method to compute the shape weightsW s :
W s  rI , r2 
∥λt ∥1
∥λs ∥1 (3.10)
γ 
[
W sα
β
]
(3.11)
In the following sections, this face appearance model is used to represent each face
as a vector γ which is the concatenation of shape parameters and texture parameters.
In the experiments, glasses, beard and moustache are regarded as unexpected
features as they cannot be appropriately represented in the appearance models.
PCA assumes data following Gaussian distribution. However, facial hairs and facial
accessories are not Gaussian distributed in a dataset. To achieve the goal of reducing
the variances of the unexpected facial components in the PCA, the images in the
appearance model training set are manually selected to make the unexpected facial
components rarely appear in the training set, so that they are regarded as noise and
ignored by the model. Fig. 3.5 shows that the glasses, beard and moustache are
ignored by the model with minor effect on other facial components.
1In [41] the appearance models are obtained by applying a (third) PCA to the concatenation of
shape model parameters and texture model parameters.
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3.2 Facial landmark detection
Facial landmark localisation is a key step of face alignment in face recognition [64],
[65] and face de-identification [30], [47], [66]. It also plays an important role in many
other face related applications including face animation [67], face tracking [68]–[70]
and face modelling [57], [59], [64], [71]. As mentioned in the previous section, the
facial landmark coordinates can define the shape of a face.
Various approaches have been proposed to achieve automatic facial landmarks
detection. These approaches build models based on the face appearance or features.
In general, the model can be a generative model such as AAMs [58], [72]–[74], or a
discriminative model such as Active Shape Models (ASMs) [61], CLMs [39], [75] or
Deformable Part Models (DPMs) [76]. The facial landmarks are allocated through
the model fitting. It can be a challenging task because of the large variances in the
head pose, unexpected obscure or uneven illumination on the image. Recently, more
deep neural network approaches [28], [77], [78] have been proposed to address the
facial landmark detection task.
Cootes et al. proposed ASM [61] to solve the problem of locating examples of
known objects in images. ASM adds a fitting process directly to the PDM which
is the shape model mentioned in Section 3.1.2. The ASM fitting process starts by
placing a model instance at an approximate position, and the fitting process updates
the position, orientation, scale and the shape model parameters of the instance until
convergence. The location of each model point is updated along profiles normal to
the model boundary until the model boundary corresponds to an edge in the image.
The performance of this method is limited because it requires a relatively simple
structure of the object in the image.
ASM only uses the shape information of an object while the later proposed
AAM [58] represents both shape information and texture information in an appear-
ance model as described in Section 3.1.2. Unlike ASM which minimises the distance
between model points and the corresponding points in the image, AAM fitting
process minimises the difference between the synthesised model image and the input
target image. However, solving such an optimisation problem is computationally
expensive. It is inefficient using the standard gradient descent algorithms in AAM
fitting because the partial derivatives and Hessian need to be recomputed in each
iteration. In [58], Cootes et al. assume that the relationship between error image and
additive increments to the parameters are linear, so the gradients are calculated only
once in their algorithm. Furthermore, Matthews and Baker [42] extended the inverse
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compositional algorithm for AAMs to import the fitting performance. AAM require
the appearance model can generate an appearance close to the input image while
using one appearance model sometimes is not accurate. As a result, view-based
AAMs [79], person-specific AAMs [80] were proposed for specific purposes.
In 2008, Cristinacce and Cootes [39] showed an efficient and robust method of
locating a set of landmark points in an object of interest. From a training set, they
constructed a joint model of the appearance of each landmark point together with
their relative positions. The method of building the CLM is similar to the AAM. The
main difference is that instead of modelling the whole object region CLM models a
set of local feature templates based on the known spatial relationship between the
local features. It is an alternative method of AAM. In CLM the detector is constrained
by a face shape template. Thus the detector will not search randomly in the image
but a particular interest area. It makes the CLM algorithm more robust and more
accurate than the AAM search method. The processing time of CLM is 4 fps for
static images. However, when tracking face with CLM the processing time is able to
achieve 25 fps, which is fast enough to process a video in real-time.
In 2011, Sauer et al. [81] showed the superior generalisation performance of
random forest within a Sequential AAM framework. The Random Forest can
be as efficient as a boosting procedure without significant reduction in accuracy.
Later, Cootes et al. [82] demonstrated that combining the Random Forest regression
with a statistical shape model (e.g. CLM, ASM or Pictorial Structure Matching) is
significantly faster and more accurate than equivalent discriminative or boosted
regression-based methods trained on the same dataset. The proposed hybrid took
27 ms (37 fps) on a single core to search on a face image [82]. This approach is fast
enough to track faces in real-time. Another contribution of this approach is on the
robustness because the coarseness of the sampling step can be adjusted to balance
between speed and accuracy.
Baltrusaitis et al. [40] proposed the CLNF for facial landmark detection and
tracking in 2013. This model includes two main novelties. First, it introduced a
probabilistic landmark detector that can learn non-linear and spatial relationships
between the input pixels and the probability of a landmark being aligned. Secondly,
this model is optimised using a novel non-uniform Regularised Landmark Mean-
Shift optimisation technique, which considers the reliabilities of each patch expert.
Because this approach considers the unseen illumination and in-the-wild data, the
experimental results showed that its accuracy is higher than CLM. It is a complex
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system, and the main drawback is that the processing speed is not fast enough to
achieve a real-time process.
Most of the landmark detection methods minimise the error functions through
second-order descent methods. However, such optimisation schemes have two main
drawbacks: (a) the error function might not be differentiable; and (b) the Hessian
might be large and not positive definite. To overcome these drawbacks, Xiong and
De la Torre [83] proposed Supervised Descent Method (SDM) for minimising a
non-linear least square function. This method learns a set of descent directions
through supervised training. The learned descent directions are used in the test
phase to minimise the objective function without computing the Jacobian nor the
Hessian. Thismethod is fast and able to achieve real-time processing in face landmark
detection. The results in [83] showed that it outperformed the person-specific AAM
in terms of accuracy.
Furthermore, the research on facial landmark detection is not only in 2D but
also 3D. Sangineto published a paper of pose and expression independent facial
landmark localisation in 2012 [84]. It presented an approach to automatic localisation
of facial feature points which deals with pose, expression, and identity variations
combining 3D shape models with local image patch classification. A SURF-like
feature, which called Dense Upright SURF (DU-SURF) is used in this approach and
compared with other modern features. The experiment results showed that the
accuracy of the proposed approach is higher than CLM.
In recent years, Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is the state-of-the-art
approach to extract features from images. Face landmark detection methods also
adopt CNN to improve their robustness and accuracy. In [85], Zhou et al. designed a
coarse-to-fine deep CNN cascade which is able to detect a large number of facial
landmarks. Four deep CNN levels are designed to form the network cascade. The
proposed system can detect 51 inner points (mouth, nose, eyes and eyebrows) and
17 contour points from a human face.
Trigeorgis et al. [77] proposed the convolutional recurrent neural network archi-
tecture which can be trained in an end-to-end manner. The convolutional module
extracts features and the recurrent module facilitates the optimisation of the regres-
sors. It is shown that the learned features from the convolutional module outperform
the hand-crafted features for landmark detection. In contrast to traditional cascaded
regression frameworks, the recurrent module acts as a memory unit which shares
information across all cascade levels. The accuracy of this method outperforms the
state-of-the-art methods including SDM and the cascade CNN.
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Table 3.1 Types of similarity metrics that are used in feature matching
Metric Formula
Euclidean distance
(∑n
i1
(
xi − yi
)2) 1/2 or ∥x − y∥
City block distance
∑n
i1
xi − yi  or ∥x − y∥1
Minkowski distance
(∑n
i1
xi − yi p) 1/p or ∥x − y∥p
Cosine similarity 1 − x·y∥x∥∥y∥
Chi-squared distance
∑n
i1
(xi−yi)2
xi+yi
3.3 Face recognition
There are two types of face recognition tasks:
Verification (one to one matching) — “is the person whom he/she claims to be”.
Identification (one to many matching) — “who the person is”.
A face recognition process usually includes face detection, face alignment (see
Section 3.2), feature extraction and feature matching, in which feature extraction and
feature matching are the two key steps. Verification and identification can share
the first three steps, and the only difference can be in the last feature matching
step. Typically, both verification and identification compare the similarity of the
face features; while sometimes identification on a close set can get the probability
distribution from a classifier directly, e.g. using a softmax function in neural networks.
3.3.1 Feature matching
The similarities can be measured using many metrics. Table 3.1 shows the commonly
used metrics. Euclidean distance and city block distance are two particular cases
of Minkowski distance when p  1, 2. Euclidean distance is the most common
metric used in feature matching and squared Euclidean distance, ∥x − y∥22, is often
implemented for efficiency. Unlike other distances, cosine similarity measures the
angular difference between two vectors. It is also used for feature matching [86], [87].
Chi-squared distance can be regarded as weighted square Euclidean distance. It
usually be used to compare the similarity of two histograms.
36 Related work
3.3.2 Face features
Face features are the low dimensional representation of face images in a face
manifold or subspace. They keep the discriminative information which is useful
for distinguishing the faces from different identities and reduce the redundant
information which is not related to identities to improve the robustness and efficiency
of face recognition system. Face features can be divided into three categories,
depending on the manner in which they are constructed.
Holistic approach analyses the whole image or region(s) of interest. The feature
represents the most desired characteristics of the image. For example, applying
linear methods such as PCA, ICA and LDA to the image.
Local representation approach uses local image (texture) descriptor, e.g. Local
Binary Patterns (LBP), Local Phase Quantisation (LPQ), Histogram of Oriented
Gradient (HOG), SIFT, SURF, etc. Then the concatenation or the histogram of
the local representations is used as a feature vector.
Deep neural network approach is an end-to-end approach that learns the face
features through optimising a loss function. In contrast to hand-crafted
features mentioned above, the learned features tend to be more robust and
suitable for the face recognition task, although they are hard to explain.
Holistic approaches
At the early stage, face recognition used to employ a local approach where the
features were facial geometric information. In [88], the facial landmarks such as the
position of eyes, nose, ears, etc. were used to construct a 16 dimension feature vector
which included the ratio of landmark distances and angles. The similarity of vectors
was measured with Euclidean distance. The advantage of using facial geometric
information is that it is insensitive to the illumination. Nevertheless, automatic facial
landmark detection techniques are not always reliable even now.
Later the colour intensity was used to compare the similarities between face
images. However, the vector of pixels in one image has a large dimensionality.
The dimension reduction methods such as PCA was therefore employed in face
recognition. The first application of PCA to face recognition was proposed by Turk
and Pentland [89]. This method decomposes a face image into a mean face plus a
weighted sum of principal components under the assumption that the face manifold
is linear. As each principal component has a face shape like structure, this method
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is also known as “Eigenfaces” technique where each principal component is an
Eigenface.
The PCA method selects the face subspace which contains the most variation
in the training set. However, they are not necessarily related to the identities. For
example, Fig. 3.6a illustrates the distribution of the PCA-based face features. The
large variation in head pose or face expressions can introduce a shift to the face
features that is higher than the difference between identities. This makes PCA-
based face recognition systems noticeably sensitive to illumination, head pose and
expressions. Linear and nonlinear approaches are proposed to address this problem.
The most straightforward way is to find a subspace in the PCA subspace via Fisher’s
Linear Discriminant (FLD) or Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). This method was
proposed by Belhumeur et al. [90] and named as “Fisherfaces”. It is a supervised
learning process to find the linear subspaceΦ, which maximises the ratio
arg max
Φ
Φ⊤SbΦΦ⊤SwΦ , (3.12)
where Sb denotes the between-class (inter-class) scatter matrix and Sw denotes the
within-class (intra-class) scatter matrix. The face features will be further reduced to
c − 1 dimension, where c is the number of classes. Experiments in [90] showed the
Fisherface technique outperformed Eigenface in handling variation in illumination
and facial expressions.
Edwards et al. [91] demonstrated AAM is able to improve the stability of face
identification and tracking when there is high variation in pose, expression and
illumination. Same as PCA features, the appearance model features are not guar-
anteed to be related to the identities. In their method, LDA was used to find the
ID-subspace [92]. The extracted model parameters are projected to the ID-subspace
to facilitate face identification.
Local representation approaches
Apart from using the holistic appearance information, local representation of the
image is also used in face recognition. Gabor filter was used in early face recognition
literature. In [93], Lades et al. proposed a Gabor based object recognition system
using dynamic link architecture. Later,Wiskott et al. extended thework andproposed
the Gabor wavelet-based elastic bunch graphmatching (EBGM) to recognise face [94].
In EBGM, the nodes in the graph are located at few important facial landmark points
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such as the position of the eyes and the tip of the nose. 40 complex coefficients (5
frequencies × 8 orientations) are obtained on each node. The similarities of feature
vectors are measured in cosine similarity.
LBP is a simple yet powerful image texture descriptor proposed by Ojala et
al. [95], [96]. A binary sequence is obtained by comparing the differences among the
centre pixel and its neighbourhoods. The binary pattern of a centre pixel gc with p
neighbourhoods in the radius r is calculated by
LBPp ,r 
p−1∑
i0
s
(
gi − gc) 2i , (3.13)
where
s (x) 
{
1, if x ≥ 0
0, otherwise
(3.14)
Furthermore, [96] defined the rotation invariance with uniform patterns through
counting the number of spatial transitions (bitwise 0/1 changes) in the patterns. The
uniform patterns have at most two spatial transitions, and they are denoted as LBPu2p , r .
For example, the patterns 111111112 (0 transition) and 001100002 (2 transitions) are
uniform patterns whereas the patterns 110011002 (4 transitions) and 101011002 (6
transitions) are not. The histogram of uniform patterns shows a better discrimination
than the histogram using all patterns. Essentially, the uniform patterns represent the
relatively low frequency information in an image that can only be found at edges,
corners and flat parts.
The application of using LBP in face recognition was proposed by Ahonen et
al. [97]. In their work, the face features are constructed by the histogram of LBP from
each block in a 7 × 7 grid on the image. Different weights are applied to different
blocks. For example, the eye regions have a higher weight value as they are more
important for face recognition than many other regions. The similarities between
the face features are compared in a weighted chi-squared distance. The experiment
results in [97] showed that the LBP outperformed the PCA and EBGMmethods.
LPQ [98] is another local descriptor. The LPQ descriptor uses the 2D discrete
Fourier transform to extract local phase information in a window for every image
position. The phases of the four low-frequency coefficients are decorrelated and
uniformly quantised as an eight-bit binary. LPQ features are invariant to blurring,
which has been confirmed by the experimental results in [99].
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Deep neural network approach
CNN has been used in the early research of face recognition [100]. It did not become
a popular approach to face recognition and other challenges in computer vision
field until recent years, mainly due to the limitation of computational power and
lack of data. Large enough training set is essential to a successful tuning of the vast
number of parameters in a deep neural network. Zhou et al. [101] achieved a 99.5%
recognition accuracy on the Labelled Faces in the Wild (LFW) benchmark using a
ten layer CNN which was trained with 5 million faces from 20 000 identities. The
network was trained as a multi-class classifier with a cross-entropy loss. In the test
phase, features from the last hidden layer were reduced through PCA and then the
similarities between features were measured in Euclidean distance.
In [64], a 3D face model was employed for face alignment, and a nine-layer neural
network was trained for extracting features. This method achieved a 97.35% accuracy
on LFW, and it was one of the top results in 2014. Later on, more face recognition
research focused on the latent representations of the face images and made the
training for face recognition task different from other multiclass classification tasks.
Face recognition is not precisely a multiclass classification problem, because
in most applications the number of classes (identities) is vast and sometimes not
fixed. The bottleneck layer feature embeddings are usually used to facilitate a face
verification or open set face identification task. It is required that the learned features
are discriminative, i.e. they have less difference within the same identity and more
significant difference between different identities (see Fig. 3.6). However, the features
trained with a softmax classifier cannot guarantee this requirement. Metric learning
was then considered to address this problem. Metric learning in face recognition
aims to shorten the intra-class distance while increasing the inter-class distance.
Starting from DeepID2 [102], the DeepID family [103], [104] have made use of a
joint loss which contains an identification signal and a verification signal. The
identification signal is a cross-entropy loss for different identities, and the verification
signal is a contrastive loss for the images of the same identity.
LVerif 

1
2
x i − x j22 , if yi  y j
1
2 max
(
0,m − x i − x j2)2, otherwise (3.15)
where x is the DeepID vector extracted from the input image and m denotes a margin
between two identities.
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Furthermore, Schroff et al. proposed FaceNet [105] which removes the softmax
classifier from the network architecture. The aim of the neural network to extract
unified feature embeddings which can support both recognition and clustering tasks.
The embeddings are constrained on a d dimensional hypersphere via L2 norm. The
network is trained with the triplet loss defined as
L 
n∑
i1
[xai − xpi 22 − xai − xni 22 + α]
+
(3.16)
where x denotes the embedding of the input image, a denotes an anchor sample,
p and n denote the positive (intra-class) and the negative (inter-class) samples to
the anchor sample and α denotes a margin that is enforced between positive and
negative pairs. FaceNet achieved 99.63% accuracy on LFW dataset. However, it was
trained on a 200 million face image dataset and the selection of triplets (a , p , n) is
tricky.
Wen et al. proposed another method to extract discriminative features using
CNN architecture [106]. They introduced the centre loss to the CNN training
LC 
1
2
m∑
i1
x i − cyi22 , (3.17)
where x i denotes the ith deep feature, yi denotes the class label of ith x and cyi ∈ Rd
denotes the centre of the yith class. The neural network was trained with a joint loss
of softmax cross-entropy loss and centre loss
L  LS + λLC
 −
m∑
i1
log
exp
(
W⊤yix i + byi
)
∑n
j1 exp
(
W⊤j x i + b j
) + λ2 m∑
i1
x i − cyi22 (3.18)
Training on a relatively small dataset, this method achieved a 99.28% accuracy on
LFW dataset. Fig. 3.6 is the data visualisation of face features from 10 identities
aiming to compare the traditional PCA-based features and CNN learned features.
Fig. 3.6a demonstrates the distribution of the AAM face features, which are PCA-
based features. Fig. 3.6b demonstrates the distribution of the CNN learned face
features trained with centre loss. In contrast to PCA-based face features, the features
learned by CNN are more discriminative and more useful for feature matching task.
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Fig. 3.6 Comparison of AAM face features and CNN learned face features. Top 3
PCA of both features from 10 randomly selected identities in the UNBC-McMaster
dataset. UNBC-McMaster dataset is not used in the training phase of either model.
CNN learned face features are more discriminative because the intra-class distances
are small, and the variations of head-poses and expressions are ignored.
The CNN architectures in face recognition keep updating with the state-of-the-art
network architectures, i.e. the networks become deeper andwider. The VGG building
blocks and more advanced inception blocks and residual blocks have been employed
in recent face recognition work [105], [107], [108].
3.4 Facial expression synthesis
Examples of data utility that are often desired and should be preserved include
gender, age and facial expressions, among many others depending on the purpose
of the application. The data utility that this thesis most concentrate on is the facial
expressions. The facial expression contains rich information about emotion and
intention, which makes the facial expression recognition a challenging task. The
category of facial expression sometimes is coarse for analysis, and the intensity of the
facial expression needs to be detected. Facial expression intensities are quantified
results of pre-defined expressions, e.g. Facial Action Coding System (FACS) [109].
Analysis and synthesis of facial expressions can be traced back to the 1970s [110].
Since then significant research efforts have beenmade to generate realistic synthesised
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facial expressions. These have led to the advancement of FET, which has been widely
implemented in computer graphics and vision, character animation, computer games
and advertising. The movie industry has long been refining motion capture and the
transfer of facial expressions from an actor to a CGI-generated movie character [111],
[112]. Furthermore, the MPEG-4 Face and Body Animation (MPEG-4 FBA) is the
part of MPEG-4 Standard (ISO14496), which uses a set of points to represent the face
and body movement of animation characters.
In recent years, AAM[57] has beenbroadlyused for buildingnon-rigiddeformable
models. In face biometrics, this model provides a compact statistical representation
of the shape and appearance variation of the face as measured in 2D images.
AAM derived facial representations were employed in a prior study [113], and its
experimental results proved representations using this method to be highly useful
for the task of facial action recognition.
A relevantwork [114] focuses on real-timedynamic facial expression transfer using
AAMs, generating realistic talking faces in real-time at a low computational cost. The
proposal assessed how a fitted expression from one AAM could be used to synthesise
the same expression realistically onto another person or animated character in a
separate AAM. The procedure has been seen to produce video sequences that are
smooth and seemingly acceptable. Similarly, the study in [115] described techniques
for manipulating facial gestures and global head movements in video sequences
of people engaged in conversation. These operations can be applied blindly to
participants interacting through a video conference. Such techniques operate in real
time at video frame-rate due to the simple mapping of parameters between AAMs,
which is performed without requiring high-level semantic information about the
facial expressions. A more recent implementation [116] presented ad hoc control
of the facial expressions of a target actor by cloning the facial expressions from
an actor in a source video, which is in real-time as well. This method maximises
photometric consistency between the input and the re-rendered output video so that
the synthesised expressions are virtually indistinguishable from a real video.
Chapter 4
Face de-identification with cluster
swapping
4.1 Introduction
It has beenmentioned inChapter 2 that the k-Same andmodel-based k-Samemethods
form clusters of similar original face images and synthesise the de-identified face
images for each cluster using the average face of the cluster members. These methods
comply with the k-anonymity theorem and hence can guarantee a re-identification
risk lower than 1/k. However, the theoretical upper bound 1/k means that a large
value of k is required in order to achieve a low re-identification risk.
The most common attack on the de-identified face dataset is that the attacker
uses the de-identified face image to match with a gallery of real face images and
tries to find the real identity of the de-identified face image. If there always exists
a gallery image which has a shorter distance to the de-identified face image than
its true original identity, then the attacker will always mismatch the de-identified
faces. This is also known as wrong-map protection. Data swapping is one approach
to provide wrong-map protection. However, unlike tabular data which can swap
multiple attributes, a face dataset can only swap the face images against their identity
labels and vice versa. This means when wrong-map protection is applied to the
face dataset directly, the face images in the original dataset still have identical copies
in the de-identified dataset. The de-identified images are still in a high-risk status,
although the links to their real labels are broken.
This chapter introduces a novel face de-identification method named k-Same-
furthest, which aims to further reduce the re-identification risk and remove the
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dependence of re-identification risk on k. The proposed method applies a wrong-
map to the k-Same clustering results to further reduce the re-identification risks.
Specifically, based on the k-Same-M framework, the proposed method adds data
swapping processing to the k-Same-M de-identification method. It selects a pair of
clusters that have the longest distance between each other in the feature subspace
and swaps the mean values of the pair of clusters. In terms of reducing the re-
identification risk, the proposed method gathers the advantages from both k-Same
and wrong-map protection.
1) There are at least k identical copies of a face image in the de-identified face
set and a face recognition software will associate all k copies to one particular
identity although they originally associate to k different identities.
2) The face recognition software tends to recognise to a wrong identity because
the de-identified faces have a large distance to their original faces in the face
feature space.
On the other hand, the k-Same-furthest face de-identificationmethod itself cannot
provide the preservation of the data utility. It assumes that the desired data utility is
not represented or has a low variance in the face feature space. Nevertheless, the
k-Same-furthest face de-identification can combine with other approaches to achieve
data utility preservation. For example, apply it to a data utility biased subset such as
in k-Same-select [29] or transfer data utility information from original face to the
de-identified face (see Chapter 7).
4.2 k-Same-furthest
The proposed face de-identification method, k-Same-furthest, is a k-Same solution,
which repeats each de-identified face at least k times in the de-identified face set Hd.
To maximise the removal of PII from the original faces, the k-Same-furthest method
uses wrong-map and de-identifies each original face I ∈ H with the centroid of the
cluster that is, identity-wise, furthest away from it. In contrast to the proposed k-Same-
furthest method, the original k-Same method will be described as k-Same-closest in
the following descriptions.
The k-Same-furthest calculates the average as the aggregate of k faces, although
other measures can be used to perform the aggregation. The identity similarity can
be measured in the pixel space, or a projected feature subspace such as the Eigenface
subspace [89] or the feature space constructed by an AAM [42], [57]. To prevent ghost
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Fig. 4.1 An iteration of the k-Same-furthest face de-identification process with an
example data set, where original samples γ(i)f in the cluster Cf are de-identified as µc
(the centroid of the cluster Cc) and original samples γ(i)c in Cc are de-identified as µf
(the centroid of cluster Cf). i  1, 2, . . . , k with k  4 here.
artefacts in the de-identified faces, k-Same-furthest performs averaging of faces in
the AAM feature space which is the same as the model-based k-Same method [30].
The k-Same-furthest de-identification process is iterative. In each iteration, two
clusters are formed hierarchically from two seeds, and members of a cluster are
de-identified with the centroid of the other cluster. The clustering process in k-Same-
furthest ensures the two seeds have a maximum Euclidean distance between each
other in the AAM feature space.
For a given face set H, the proposed k-Same-furthest projects H to the feature
space constructed by a trained AAM and generates Γ which is a set of appearance
model features of the original faces γ. The feature set is stored as amatrix withmodel
features as the row vectors. For a person-specific dataset, each row represents one
unique identity. All the subsequent operations of de-identification are performed
in the AAMmodel feature space. Each iteration of the proposed de-identification
process deals with at least 2k faces remaining in Γ and remove them from Γ at the
end of each iteration. Γ becomes an empty set when the de-identification process is
completed.
When there are more than 2k faces in Γ, the k-Same-furthest algorithm de-
identifies 2k original faces. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the results of a de-identification
iteration for an example data set when k  4. To simplify illustration and ease of
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understanding, a 2D dataset of scalars is used in Fig. 4.1. γ(1)c is the feature vector
of a face that triggers the de-identification process and γ(1)f is the furthest feature
vector to γ(1)c . Cc and Cf denote the clusters which is closest and furthest to γ
(1)
c . A
high dimensional sphere in the feature space is defined by the cluster centroid µ and
radius r.
µ 
1
|C |
|C |∑
i1
γi (4.1)
r  max
γ∈C
γ − µ (4.2)
The cluster centroid µ and the cluster sphere radius r are updated whenever a new
member is added to the cluster.
Cluster Cc is formed by selecting the closest faces to µc from Γ (the remaining
original face features) and hence the closest cluster of features to γ(1)c that is available
in Γ. Cluster Cf is formed by selecting from Γ the closest faces to µf and hence the
furthest cluster of features to γ(1)c that is available in Γ. Cluster Cc may not be the
closest cluster of face features to γ(1)c in the whole face set but it is the closest among
the remaining original faces that have not been de-identified or added to a cluster.
The same holds for cluster Cf. To apply the wrong-map to the de-identification
results, the proposed k-Same-furthest method de-identifies the members in a cluster
with the centroid of the other cluster. Since cluster Cc is identify-wise the closest
cluster to γ(1)c and Cf the furthest, they are identity-wise the furthest away from each
other, meaning the de-identified face images have a low risk to be associated with
their original face images.
To avoid members of a cluster have a higher chance to be recognised as their
original identity after data swapping, overlappingmust be avoided between Cc and
Cf. In the proposed method, two clusters overlapwhen
rc + rf ≥
µc − µf (4.3)
Overlapping between two clusters weakens the identity loss when data swap is
applied to the cluster centroids. Furthermore, an original feature can even be the
closest one to its de-identified feature after data swapping, when the centroid of the
opposite cluster moves into the cluster sphere where the original feature is in.
Whenever a new member is added to a cluster, k-Same-furthest checks to see
whether overlapping is caused by this new member. If so, this new member is
moved back to Γ and the clustering loop for both Cc and Cf is terminated, as this new
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member is the closest to the cluster and therefore adding any other remaining face
to Cc or Cf would even shorten the distance between the two clusters. If clustering
is stopped before Cc and Cf has been assigned k faces each, faces closest to the
centroid of each cluster are selected from Γ and added to the cluster to fill up the
gaps. However, the centroids of Cc and Cf are frozen during this process, i.e. the
cluster centroids are calculated using those members before overlapping appears.
When |H | is not a multiple of 2k, there will be fewer than 2k faces remaining in Γ
after
⌊ |H |
2k
⌋
iterations. The remaining faces will be associated to one of the last two
clusters depends on their distances to the latest µc and µf. For example, the faces
closer to µc will be associated with Cc and then de-identified with the centroid of
the opposite cluster µf. Again, the values of µc and µf are not updated during this
process.
Theorem 1. If H is a person-specific face set where |H | ≥ 2k, k is a privacy constraint
and Hd  k-Same-furthest(H, k), k > 1, then Hd satisfies k-anonymity.
Proof. The proposed algorithm de-identifies original faces as the centroids of various
face clusters. There are 2 ·
⌊ |H |
2k
⌋
clusters formed in the clustering process. For each
cluster centroid calculated, at least k copies of the same de-identified face images are
added to Hd, making the k or more copies in Hd indistinguishable. In other words,
Hd satisfies k-anonymity and always guarantees a recognition rate less than 1/k.
Furthermore, the de-identified face images in Hd has a one-to-one correspondence
to an original face in H. Therefore, |Hd |  |H | and for each I ∈ H there exists
Id ∈ Hd.
Lemma 2. Let µn be the centroid of a cluster Cn of n face features and µn+1 the
centroid of Cn+1 which consists of Cn and an additional face feature x ∈ Γ. Cn∩Γ  .
If x is the closest feature in set Γ to µn , there cannot exit any other face feature in Γ
that is closer to µn+1 than x.
Proof. Given x is the closest feature to the centroid µn in Γ,
x  arg min
γ∈Γ
γ − µn (4.4)
The distances from µn and µn+1 to x are
dn  min
γ∈Γ
γ − µn  x − µn (4.5)
dn+1 
x − µn+1 (4.6)
48 Face de-identification with cluster swapping
The centroids µn and µn+1 can be calculated by (4.1) and imply that
µn+1 
1
n + 1
(
nµn + x
)
(4.7)
Therefore, (4.6) can be re-written as
dn+1 
x − 1n + 1 (nµn + x)

n
n + 1
x − µn (4.8)

n
n + 1dn < dn  minγ∈Γ
γ − µn , n ∈ N+
Moreover, the update of centroid ∆µ  1n+1
(
x − µn
)
have the same direction as
x − µn , which means the distance decrement of other face features γ ∈ Γ are at most
the same as x.
Thus, x is closer to the updated centroid µn+1 than any other face features γ ∈ Γ,
if x is the closest feature in set Γ to µn .
Note that there can be face features in Cn that are closer to µn+1 than x.
Definition 4.1 (wrong-map). Given a person-specific face set H, a de-identification
function f : H → Hd provides wrong-map protection if
p
(
I( j)
 Id(i)) > p (I(i)  Id(i)) , ∀Id(i) ∈ Hd.
Theorem 3. IfH is a person-specific face set, k is a privacy constraint, k > 1, |H | ≥ 2k,
Hd  k-Same-furthest(H, k), k-Same-furthest(H, k) uses dist
(
γ1, γ2
)

γ1 − γ2 to
measure the identity distance between any two faces γ1 and γ2, then Hd satisfies
wrong-map protection with the distance metric dist(γ1, γ2).
Proof. Since Cn+1  Cn ∪ {x} and Lemma 2 states that no other face feature in Γ can
be closer to µn+1 than x, the feature that is closest to µn+1 must be a member of Cn+1
when clusters are formed in the way described in Lemma 2, i.e. the cluster adds the
face feature that is closest to the current centroid. Furthermore, k-Same-furthest()
forms two clusters simultaneously, meaning Cn in Lemma 2 can be either Cc or
Cf. k-Same-furthest() de-identifies the members of a cluster as the centroid of the
opposite cluster. A member in Cf can only be the closest face to the centroid of Cc
after swapping when there is no overlapping between Cf and Cc, and vice versa.
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Case 1 (no overlapping between two clusters)
Given a cluster Cc and its opposite cluster Cf. According to Lemma 2, there
always exists a member in Cf closer to µf than any member in Cc,
min
γ∈Cf
γ − µf < minγ∈Cc γ − µf
Using the opposite centroid µf to de-identify all the face features in Cc gives
that
p
(
γ
( j)
f
 µf) > p (γ(i)c  µf) , ∃ j ∈ {1, . . . , k} , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} .
The same holds for Cf.
Case 2 (two clusters do not overlap while the size of each cluster is less than k)
Let the maximum number of members of both clusters before overlapping be
k′, where 1 ≤ k′ < k. Because the centroids are only calculated with the first
k′ members. The first k′ members in both clusters satisfy Case 1, and the rest
members in Cc are selected from Γ which cannot be the closest face feature to
µf, according to Lemma 2. Therefore,
p
(
γ
( j)
f
 µf) > p (γ(i)c  µf) , ∃ j ∈ {1, . . . , k′} , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} .
The same holds for Cf.
Case 3 (remaining features in Γ are less than 2k)
This case is similar to Case 2. Because all the remaining face features in Γ can
be neither the closest to µc nor µf. Assume that µc and µf of the latest formed
clusters are calculated with k′ members and the final size of the last cluster is
m, where 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k and m ≥ k. For Cc, it can be found that
p
(
γ
( j)
f
 µf) > p (γ(i)c  µf) , ∃ j ∈ {1, . . . , k′} , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} .
The same holds for Cf.
In all cases, the de-identified faces will be matched with the original faces in
the opposite cluster rather than their corresponding original faces, as long as the
matching process uses the same distance measure as k-Same-furthest(). Thus, the
described face de-identification method satisfies wrong-map protection.
50 Face de-identification with cluster swapping
Algorithm 3: k-Same-furthest
input :Person-specific face set H;
Privacy constant k, whit |H | ≥ 2k; Trained appearance modelsM.
output :De-identified face set Hd
1 Hd ←  ;
2 Γ←M(H), Γd ←  ;
3 for ∃γ ∈ Γ do
4 if |Γ | ≥ 2k then
5 Select γ(1)c randomly;
6 γ(1)f ← arg maxγ∈Γ dist(γ(1)c , γ);
7 Add γ(1)c to Cc; Add γ
(1)
f to Cf; Remove γ
(1)
c and γ
(1)
f from Γ ;
8 µc ← γ(1)c ; µf ← γ(1)f ;
9 while |Cc | < k and |Cf | < k do
10 γf ← arg minγ∈Γ dist(µf , γ);
11 γc ← arg minγ∈Γ dist(µc, γ);
12 Add γc to Cc; Add γf to Cf ;
13 Remove γc and γf from Γ ;
14 Update centroids µc ← 1|Cc |
∑|Cc |
i1 γ
(i)
c , µf ← 1|Cf |
∑|Cf |
i1 γ
(i)
f ;
15 if overlap between Cc and Cf then
16 Move the last added members of both Cc and Cf cluster to Γ ;
17 Update µc and µf ;
18 break; // Break from while loop
19 end
20 end
21 if |Cc | < k or |Cf | < k then
22 {γ(i)f } ← kNN(Γ, µf , k − |Cf |);
23 Add {γ(i)f } to Cf, Remove {γ(i)f } from Γ ;
24 {γ(i)c } ← kNN(Γ, µc, k − |Cc |);
25 Add {γ(i)c } to Cc, Remove {γ(i)c } from Γ ;
26 end
27 Add k copies of µf to de-identify the faces in Cc; Cc ←  ;
28 Add k copies of µc to de-identify the faces in Cf; Cf ←  ;
29 else
30 if dist(γ, µf) > dist(γ, µc) then
31 Add µf to Γd to de-identify γ ;
32 else
33 Add µc to Γd to de-identify γ ;
34 end
35 end
36 end
37 Hd ←M−1(Γd) ;
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(a) Neutral (b) Happy (c) Arbitrary expression
Fig. 4.2 Example face images from the IMM dataset
4.3 Experiments
4.3.1 Dataset
Experiments were conducted with the IMMdataset [117], which contains face images
of 40 subjects with different facial expression and head pose. Only the images with a
near-frontal pose have been used, which includes a neutral, a happy and an arbitrary
expression face images from each subject. As shown in Fig. 4.2, There is variation in
head pose among the neutral as well as the happy faces, and there are variations in
both pose and lighting among the arbitrary expression faces.
4.3.2 Test design
The re-identification risk of the proposed k-Same-furthest algorithm is measured
through comparing the similarities of the face features in the Eigenface subspace
and the appearance model subspace which is the same feature space used in k-
Same-furthest face de-identification. The rank-1 recognition rate is used as the
re-identification risk. The face images used in the experiments are aligned and
cropped based on the AAM detected face landmarks. The images are masked and
showing only the region inside the contour of the face shapes. The cropped original
face images from 70% subjects in the IMM dataset have been used to train the PCA
used in the re-identification experiment as well as the AAM in the k-Same-furthest
method. In the test phase, all cropped original images with various expressions are
used as the gallery and the de-identified images as the probes. All results reported
are the average results based on ten runs with different training data from the IMM
dataset.
4.3.3 Results and discussions
Fig. 4.3 shows the rank-1 re-identification risk for the cropped original faces against
the faces de-identified using either k-Same-M or the k-Same-furthest. As shown
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Fig. 4.3 Re-identification risks of de-identified faces
in Fig. 4.3, when the face de-identification and re-identification using the same
feature space, the k-Same-furthest always produces a re-identification risk of zero
while k-Same-M remain just lower than the theoretical upper bound 1/k by around
2–3%. When PCA representation of face images is used in the re-identification, the
re-identification risk of the k-Same-furthest is slightly above zero whilst stays far
lower than the risk of k-Same-M. Regardless of which feature space the recognition
software uses to represent face images, the re-identification risk of the k-Same-M
de-identified faces reduces along with the theoretical upper bound 1/k. It requires
k-Same-M to use large k value in order to achieve decent privacy protection. However,
with k-Same-furthest, the wrong-map protection keeps the re-identification risk
staying at zero or slightly above zero even with a small k value.
Fig. 4.4 displays the de-identification results of the proposed k-Same-furthest
algorithm with three different expression faces from the same individual. The facial
expression is preserved by forming clusters onlywith the original faces with the same
expression label as the target face. Fig. 4.5 displays the de-identification results of
the k-Same-furthest algorithm where no preservation of data utility is implemented
and hence the entire image gallery containing faces with various expressions and
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Fig. 4.4 De-identification results of the proposed algorithm with data utility preser-
vation.
Original k  2 k  3 k  5 k  10 k  20 k  40 k  60
Fig. 4.5 De-identification results of the proposed algorithm without data utility
preservation.
various head poses has been used to form the face clusters. The de-identified faces
display various expressions and head poses. When k is small, the de-identified faces
tend to display an expression and a head pose which have a larger difference to the
target face image. As k increases, the cluster on which the de-identified face is based
becomes more diverse. As a result, the de-identified faces tend to appear as generic
average faces which have low variations on facial expressions and head poses.
As shown in Fig. 4.4 and 4.5, the de-identified faces for each original appear
significantly different from their corresponding originals. In the meantime, Because
the face appearance model is used in the proposed face de-identification method,
the de-identified face images have high visual quality.
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4.4 Conclusions
This chapter proposed a novel face de-identification method, k-Same-furthest, which
introduces wrong-map protection to the k-Same face de-identification. In contrast to
k-Same-closest algorithms, the proposed k-Same-furthest algorithm de-identifies
faces based on the faces that are furthest away from them in a feature space that has
been constructed to maximise the variation among identities and hence maximises
the identity loss. It assumes that the desired data utility is not represented or
has a low variance in the face feature space. Nevertheless, the k-Same-furthest
face de-identification can be applied to a data utility biased subset to preserve the
data utility, and the results are demonstrated in Fig. 4.4. In terms of reducing the
re-identification risk, the proposedmethod inherits the advantages from both k-Same
and wrong-map protection. For a simple re-identification attack, the face recognition
software tends to recognise to a wrong identity regardless the value of k, because
the de-identified faces have a large distance to their original faces in the face feature
space. For more advanced re-identification attack, at least k original identities will
share an identical de-identified face image, and this will restrict the re-identification
risk by any attack to 1/k.
Chapter 5
Distinguishable face de-identification
5.1 Introduction
The family of k-Same face de-identification methods de-identify a face dataset by
dividing the dataset into clusters of at least k face images, then generating an
aggregate face image for each cluster and finally replacing all images in a cluster
with the same aggregated image. The advantage of making the de-identified dataset
to have at least k identical copies of every aggregated face is that no face recognition
software can build a one-to-one link with such data. On the other side, one drawback
of these k-Same approaches is that the identical copies of face images in the dataset
reduce the diversity of a dataset and the de-identified data cannot support certain
tasks. For example, using the same de-identified face for multiple individuals make
it impossible to track an individual in a de-identified video.
Consider a face datasetH and its de-identified datasetHd that has been generated
by a k-Same approach. The number of unique face images in H is |H | and in Hd
is
⌊ |H |
k
⌋
. This information loss is due to a decrease in data diversity. Nevertheless,
k-anonymity requires microaggregation in order to guarantee a re-identification risk
lower than 1/k.
To address the loss of diversity issue with the k-Same face de-identification
methods, a novel face de-identification method named k-Diff-furthest is proposed
and presented in this Chapter. Instead of using the same face to de-identify a
group of faces, the k-Diff-furthest generate distinguishable de-identified faces and
therefore is able to support a larger variety of applications, especially when tracking
of individuals is required. The proposed k-Diff-furthest face de-identification is
modified from the k-Same-furthest method. It has been discussed in Chapter 4 that
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if the desired data utility has low variance in the face feature space, increasing the
distance between the original face feature and the de-identified face feature can
reduce the re-identification risk. Like the k-Same-furthest method, the k-Diff-furthest
face de-identification method selects the two groups of faces that have the longest
distance to each other to achieve a large identity loss. Unlike the k-Same-furthest
method, each group of face features is not replaced by the centroid of its opposite
group but shifted towards it in the feature space. This new approach generates a
unique (different) de-identified face for each of the k original faces in a cluster. It is
hence named k-Diff-furthest.
5.2 k-Diff-furthest face de-identification
5.2.1 The proposed algorithm
The proposed k-Diff-furthest algorithm transforms the given person-specific face
set H from the RGB pixel space to a pre-trained AAM feature space to ensure the
alignment of face textures. The AAM representation of the original face set H is
denoted as Γ, and its corresponding de-identified appearance model feature set Γd.
Similar to the process of the k-Same-furthest method, k-Diff-furthest is iterative
and completes two tasks in each iteration. The first task is to form two clusters Cc
and Cf in Γ with a given original face γ(1)c , where γ
(1)
c is the trigger of the current
iteration and Cc is formed with faces closest to γ(1)c while Cf with those furthest from
it. Once an original face is assigned to a cluster, it is removed from Γ. The second
task of each iteration is to generate a de-identified face γd for each original in Cc and
Cf.
In order to guarantee a privacy protection level better than 1/k, all the k-Same-
closest methods demand that each cluster formed in the de-identification process
must contain at least k members. Furthermore, k-Same-furthest adds wrong-map
protection to further reduce the re-identification risk, by preventing overlapping
between the two clusters formed in each iteration. k-Diff-furthest follows the same
approach and adopts wrong-map protection. The definition of overlapping and other
variables such as cluster centroid µ and cluster sphere radius r are the same as those
used in the Chapter 4.
Whenever the clusters Cc and Cf receives a new member each, k-Diff-furthest
checks whether overlapping is caused by the two new members. If so, both new
members are removed from their clusters and the cluster formation for both Cc and
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Face feature space in a
simplified 2D illustration
Shiing of face feature vectors
lead to the appearance
changes on faces
Fig. 5.1 The k-Diff-furthest face de-identification swaps original faces between a pair
of clusters in order to retain the diversity of the original face set in the de-identified
face set.
Cf is terminated to avoid overlapping in the feature space between the two clusters.
As a result, the size of the clusters formed in the k-Diff-furthest process might be
less than k.
To provide the wrong-map protection, k-Same-furthest de-identifies the originals
in Cc and Cf by swapping the cluster centroids. Whilst the same approach is adopted
in k-Diff-furthest, the two methods differ in the way the de-identified faces are
computed. The k-Same-furthest algorithm implements k-anonymity and uses the
centroid of Cc as the de-identified face for all the faces in Cf and vice versa. In
the k-Diff-furthest, for each pair of Cc and Cf, the de-identified feature vectors are
computed by replacing the centroid with the centroid of the opposite cluster (see
Fig. 5.1). More specifically,
γd 
{
γ − µc + µf , γ ∈ Cc
γ − µf + µc, γ ∈ Cf
(5.1)
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Fig. 5.2 Illustration of Theorem 4 in a 2D space
The de-identification step in k-Diff-furthest is equivalent to moving original faces in
Cc to their new centroid µf with their relative locations to the centroid unchanged,
i.e.
γ − µc  γd − µf (5.2)
The same applies to the face features in Cf.
Through this approach, k-Diff-furthest generates a unique de-identified face for
each original face in H and retains the diversity of H in Hd. As it is assumed that
original faces in H are distinguishable, k-Diff-furthest ensures that the de-identified
faces in Hd have similar distances among each other as their original faces and are
therefore equally distinguishable.
5.2.2 Wrong-map protection in k-Diff-furthest
Theorem 4. Given a privacy constraint k > 1; a person-specific face set H with |H | ≥
2k; and a face set Hd  k-Diff-furthest(H, k). k-Diff-furthest() uses dist
(
γ1, γ2
)
γ1 − γ2 to measure the identity distance between any two faces γ1 and γ2, the
k-Diff-furthest() can provide wrong-map protection as long as the de-identification
and the re-identification are using the same distance measure.
Proof. As long as the centroid µf is measured in Euclidean space, as shown in Fig. 5.2,
the shaded half of Cf must contain at least one original face γf. Within the shaded
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Algorithm 4: k-Diff-furthest
input :Person-specific face set H, cluster limiter k
output :De-identified face set Hd
1 Hd ←  ;
2 Γ←M(H), Γd ←  ;
3 for ∃γ ∈ Γ do
4 Select γ(1)c randomly;
5 γ(1)f ← arg maxγ∈Γ dist(γ(1)c , γ);
6 Cc ← {γ(1)c }; Cf ← {γ(1)f } ;
7 µc ← γ(1)c ; µf ← γ(1)f ;
8 Γ← Γ \ {γ(1)c , γ(1)f } ;
9 while |Cc | < k do
10 γf ← arg minγ∈Γ dist(µf , γ);
11 Cf ← Cf ∪ {γf} ;
12 γc ← arg minγ∈Γ dist(µc, γ);
13 Cc ← Cc ∪ {γc} ;
14 Update µc, µf, rc, rf ;
15 if dist(µc, µf) < rc + rf or γc  γf then
16 Cf ← Cf \ {γf}; Cc ← Cc \ {γc} ;
17 Update µf and µc ;
18 Break; // Break from while loop
19 end
20 Γ← Γ \ {γc, γf} ;
21 end
22 ∆γ← µc − µf ;
23 for γc ∈ Cc do
24 γd ← γc − ∆γ ;
25 Add γd to Γd to de-identify γc ;
26 end
27 for γf ∈ Cf do
28 γd ← γf + ∆γ ;
29 Add γd to Γd to de-identify γf ;
30 end
31 end
32 Hd ←M−1(Γd) ;
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half of Cf, the furthest position to γd is at γ
∗
f , meaning that
sup
{
min
γf∈Cf
γd − γf} ≤ γd − γ∗f (5.3)
According to the Triangle Inequality Theorem,γd − γ∗f < rf + γd − µf (5.4)
where, as defined in the algorithm of k-Diff-furthest(H, k),γd − µf  γ − µc ≤ rc. (5.5)
Therefore, γd − γ∗f < rf + rc (5.6)
Because overlapping between two spheres is avoided in k-Diff-furthest(),
rc + rf ≤
µc − µf (5.7)
Combining (5.3), (5.6) and (5.7) gives
min
γf∈Cf
γd − γf < µc − µf (5.8)
According to (5.1), γ − γd  µc − µf . (5.9)
Therefore, for any face γc ∈ Cc and its de-identified feature vector γd, there is
p
(
γf
 γd) > p (γc  γd) , ∃γf ∈ Cf (5.10)
The same holds ∀γf ∈ Cf. This means that a k-Diff-furthest de-identified face
has a higher similarity with at least one member in the opposite cluster than its
original. Thismethod provideswrong-map protection, as long as the face recognition
software of the re-identification attack uses the same face representation and distance
measurement as the de-identification process.
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5.3 Discussion on single-member clusters
Single-member clusters will appear in two situations: (a) when there are only one or
two left in Γ; and (b) clustering is terminated due to a violation of the non-overlapping
condition defined in (5.7). Although swapping two single-member clusters can
provide wrong-map protection, it does not change the member values. There is a
high risk when some original data have identical copies in the de-identified dataset.
This section gives two potential solutions to the pair of single-member clusters
problem and they can be simple add-ons to the k-Diff-furthest algorithm.
Algorithm 5: Avoid single-member cluster pair
input :Two new formed clusters Cc and Cf;
A set of remaining face features Γ.
1 if |Cc |  1 and |Cf |  1 then
2 γc ← arg minγ∈Γ dist(µc, γ);
3 Cc ← Cc ∪ {γc} ;
4 Γ← Γ \ {γc} ;
5 Update µc, rc ;
6 end
7 if |Γ | ≤ 2 then
8 for γ ∈ Γ do
9 if dist(γ, µc) < dist(γ, µf) then
10 Cc ← Cc ∪ {γ} ;
11 else
12 Cf ← Cf ∪ {γ} ;
13 end
14 end
15 Γ←  ;
16 end
5.3.1 Avoid the pair of single-member clusters
One potential solution is to include at least one new member into one of the last
formed clusters to break the pair of single-member clusters situation. Each time
when the non-overlapping condition terminates the cluster forming process, an
additional checking process as shown in Algorithm 5 will take place. This process
will check whether the two new clusters are single-member clusters and add an
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extra member to one cluster if so. If less than three members are remaining in Γ, this
process will force add the remaining members to their nearest clusters.
It is worth mentioning that the updated Cc and Cf may not comply with the non-
overlapping condition in (5.7). When two clusters do not satisfy the condition in (5.7),
the de-identified feature vectors may not guarantee the wrong-map protection and it
will lead a correct matching to their originals. This situation occurs to the last two
original face features in Γ when they cannot join Cc or Cf without breaking condition
in (5.7).
5.3.2 Generate random feature vectors
The second solution does not add a new member to the single-member clusters but
generates a random face sample within the neighbourhood of each single member.
However, generating a face sample is a complex task with the following difficulties:
1) The feature manifold is usually non-linear and non-continuous.
2) The small number of existing samples gives a large sample error to estimate
the distribution in a local neighbourhood.
The random sample generation method discussed in this section assumes that
the face feature manifold is linear and continuous in a small local neighbourhood.
The randomly generated face sample is constrained within the sphere with the given
face as the centroid.
For an arbitrary n dimensional vector x ∈ Rn in Euclidean space, x∥x∥ scales x
onto the surface of the unit sphere. Random sample a feature vector γ∗ around given
centroid µ within a radius r
γ∗  r · u · x∥x∥ + µ (5.11)
where u is a random number generated uniformly from (0, 1]. Equation (5.11)
generates random samples whose distance to the centroid is uniform distributed,
but the vectors are not distributed uniformly in the sphere. To random sample a
vector within the n-dimensional sphere uniformly, the radius should follow the u 1n
distribution, which gives
γ∗  r · u1/n · x∥x∥ + µ (5.12)
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Both (5.11) and (5.12) can be adopted for the random face feature generation.
The distances of the vectors generated by (5.11) to the centroid have a uniform
distribution. It means the generated vector may have a high chance to be close to the
centroid. This can be solved by increasing the lower bound of u. The face samples
generated by (5.12) tend to have large distances to the centroid when the dimension
n is high. However, when the distance gets larger, it may break the assumption and
generate feature vectors at non-continuous neighbours. As a result, unnatural face
appearance will be reconstructed from these feature vectors. The value for radius r
has been selected through trial and error. This work uses r  14
µc − µf.
5.4 Experiments
5.4.1 Dataset
Experiments in this work were conducted with face images from the IMM [117] and
the LFPW datasets. The 68-point facial landmarks as defined in Fig. 3.2 are annotated
manually for the IMM dataset, and the landmark annotations for the LFPW dataset
are provided by the 300 Faces In-the-Wild (300-W) Challenge [63] (see Fig. 5.3).
The LFPW dataset contains faces with uncontrolled head pose, facial expressions
and illumination, whereas the IMM dataset contains face images of 40 individuals
captured in a controlled environment with six images per individual (frontal neutral,
frontal happy, left rotated neutral, right rotated neutral and freestyle). A subset of
783 24-bit colour face images from the LFPW dataset and all the 40 frontal neutral
face images in the IMM dataset were used to train/construct the AAM feature space
in this work.
The face appearance which is the cropped face images showing only the region
inside the contour of face shape was used in the experiments. The contour of a face
is defined by facial landmarks (see Fig. 3.2). Each face appearance is represented as
a 59-dimensional feature vector in a trained AAM feature space, with 9 face shape
components and 50 face texture components. The face images in the LFPW dataset
were captured under various lighting conditions. As shown in Fig. 5.3, the three
LFPW images vary in overall image brightness, and two of them are significantly
brighter than those from the IMM dataset. As mentioned, this work trains an AAM
feature space with the 783 LFPW face images plus the 40 IMM face images. Due to
the large variation in overall image brightness across the two datasets, the trained
AAM feature space has the most dominant component of its face texture feature
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Fig. 5.3 Examples of face images in the testing set of re-identification test. (a–c) are
from the IMM dataset [117] and (d–f) from the LFPW dataset.
representing the overall image brightness. Considering that the overall brightness
of a face image does not contain any identifying information whereas clustering of
face images in the face de-identification process should be carried out based on the
identity features of the faces, this work sets the first texture model component to zero
for all the faces to be de-identified. This is equivalent to the brightness/histogram
equalisation procedure that is typically applied as part of the image pre-processing
process in face recognition.
There is a consensus that the neutral frontal faces can best represent identity
information, and most k-Same face de-identification algorithms (including k-Same-
Pixel/-Eigen [24], k-Same-M [30], and k-Same-furthest [66]) have only reported
experimentswith neutral frontal faces. Therefore, all images used in the experimental
evaluation of the k-Diff-furthest algorithm are neutral frontal faces. The testing set of
this work consists of the 37 colour images from the IMM dataset and another three
randomly selected images from the LFPW dataset (see Fig. 5.3d–f). The reason for
replacing the three greyscale face images in the IMM dataset is to remove the impact
of the colour format on the visual quality of the de-identified faces.
5.4.2 Re-identification risk of k-Diff-furthest
The privacy protection ability of the proposed k-Diff-furthest algorithm is measured
and compared against the performance of k-Same-M through re-identification
experiments using the AAM face appearance features, where the 40 original face
images from the testing set are de-identified, and their de-identified faces (probe)
are then matched against all the original faces (gallery) in the testing set. Both
de-identification and re-identification are conducted in AAM feature space using
Euclidean distance. In the de-identification process, the original face that triggers
5.4 Experiments 65
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
De-identification level k
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
2 5 8 11 14 17 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
R
e-
id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n
ris
k
(%
)
2 14 20
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1⁄k
k-Same-M
k-Diff-furthest, avoid
single-member pairs
k-Diff-furthest
Fig. 5.4 Re-identification risks of k-Diff-furthest
each iteration is randomly selected. All results reported are based on running the
identification process 1000 times for each value of k.
Fig. 5.4 shows the rank-1 re-identification risks of the de-identified faces against
their original faces. In Fig. 5.4, as a k-Same solution, the re-identification risk
of the k-Same-M always stays synchronized with and just below the theoretical
upper bound 1/k. The same experimental results of re-identification risk have been
reported for all the other k-Same face de-identification methods in [24], [29], [30].
The re-identification risk of k-Diff-furthest is significantly lower than the risk of the
k-Same-M. Fig. 5.4 confirms that when single-member cluster pair is allowed, the
de-identified faces generated by k-Diff-furthest always yield a recognition rate of
zero regardless of the value of k. When single-member cluster pair is not allowed
the overlapping of clusters in the feature space may lead an increasement on the
re-identification risk. However, as shown in Fig. 5.4, the increasement of the risk is
lower than 0.5%.
5.4.3 Diversity of the de-identified face set
Tomeasure the diversity of the resulting face dataset, the Euclidean distance between
each image and every other image in the set is computed in the AAM feature space.
The smaller the distance between two face feature vectors, the more difficult to
distinguish the two faces in the images.
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Table 5.1 Feature distances statistics
Face set De-id method Min Max Median Mean Std
Original – 7.836 50.502 24.634 25.743 7.319
k-Diff-furthest 12.764 50.101 26.073 26.799 6.554
De-id k-Same-closest 0.000 18.467 13.558 12.641 2.169
k-Same-furthest 0.000 31.171 19.658 19.098 4.999
Fig. 5.5 shows the histogramdistribution of pair-wise face feature distances among
the original testing face images as well as their de-identified faces generated by
k-Same-closest, k-Same-furthest and the proposed k-Diff-furthest when k  5. There
are 40 face images in the testing set, meaning each histogram in Fig. 5.5 shows the
distribution of
(40
2
)
 780 pair-wise face feature distances. Table 5.1 lists the statistics
of all the results. The calculation of standard deviation for both k-Same-closet and
k-Same-furthest has excluded the distance values of zero as this distance value is
given by repetitions of the same de-identified face.
As shown in Fig. 5.5, the distance distributions of the original faces and the
k-Diff-furthest de-identified faces have similar outlines, indicating that the diversity
of faces in terms of their facial features is kept through the k-Diff-furthest face
de-identification process and hence the k-Diff-furthest de-identified faces are equally
distinguishable as their original faces among individuals. The same conclusion
can be drawn with the results in Table 5.1, where the two sets of face images have
similar mean, std and maximum distances. In contrast to those of the original
and the k-Diff-furthest de-identified faces, the distance distributions for both the
k-Same-closest and the k-Same-furthest faces are more discrete. This reflects the
fact that k-Same methods de-identify a cluster of k original faces using the same
de-identified face, reducing the number of unique faces in the dataset from |H | to⌊ |H |
k
⌋
. This is also indicated by the spike at zero in both histograms. In addition, the
de-identified faces generated by the k-Same methods are the centroids of clusters.
The averaging effect of these de-identified faces has led to a smaller maximum
distance and a narrower distribution diagram for each k-Same method. Furthermore,
the results in Fig. 5.5 and Table 5.1 shows that the de-identified face features by
k-Same-closest are more compact than those de-identified by k-Same-furthest. It
is because the k-Same does not guarantee an optimal clustering solution and the
formed clusters are heavily overlapped (see Section 2.3.1).
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Fig. 5.5 Histogram of feature distances distribution of original faces and de-identified
faces when k=5.
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Fig. 5.6 Example faces showing relationships between the face feature distance and
the visual difference. The computed face feature distances are given in the labels for
each pair of example face images.
Fig. 5.6 illustrates the relationships between the computed face feature distances
and the visual difference displayed in the face images. Because the group of face
features get the same incremental updates, the information of the relative position
in the group is kept. The differences between original faces can also be observed
in their de-identified faces, which is highly useful for maintaining certain network
graph information in a group, such as the kinship.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents a new approach to generating distinguishable de-identified
faces, named k-Diff-furthest. It maximises the loss of identity information by shifting
the face feature to a position which is far from its original. The proposed k-Diff-
furthest method provides wrong-map protection hence the re-identification risk of
the de-identified dataset is low. Even when the avoiding single-member cluster pair
condition breaks the wrong-map protection, the re-identification risk remains at a
low level. In addition, the de-identified face dataset generated by k-Diff-furthest
maintain more information from the original dataset. In contrast to the k-Same face
de-identification methods, k-Diff-furthest maintains the diversity of the dataset and
the relative position of a face feature in its neighbourhood.
Chapter 6
Visual quality and re-identification
risk in real-world application
6.1 Introduction
The preservation of data utility and the reduction of re-identification risk conflict
with each other in face de-identification. Depending on the applications, the de-
identification methods choose difference equilibrium points to compromise between
utility and risk. In the real-world face de-identification applications, there are
even more challenges from both data utility and re-identification risk aspects. The
performance evaluation experiments presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are not complete
for a real-world application. On the data utility fold, the visual quality of the
de-identified face is an essential requirement in real-world applications. The visual
quality can be measured by the fidelity and the intelligibility of the images [118]. The
output images from previous chapters are isolated from their original background,
which have relatively low fidelity and intelligibility to a human observer. On the
re-identification risk fold, the de-identified face images are also facing a lot of
challenges as the face recognition software is becoming more and more powerful.
In Chapters 4 and 5, AAM features [58] and PCA features [89] are used as face
descriptors and the similarities are measured with Euclidean distance. However,
AAM features and PCA features are homogeneous subspace features, and they share
similar advantages and drawbacks.
Facing the challenges from the real-world applications and aiming to increase
the fidelity and intelligibility of the de-identified face images, this chapter presents
an approach to merging a de-identified face region with its original background. In
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Fig. 6.1 Overview of merging a de-identified face with its original background
the experiment part, to evaluate the re-identification risk of the de-identified face
images more thoroughly, several local image features such as LBP, HOG, and LPQ
are used in the re-identification risk testing. This chapter presents the evaluation
experiments conducted on face images with and without a background. The face
dataset used in this chapter is larger than those used in the previous chapters. The
experimental results reveal that further de-identification measures must be applied
to the background of a face image as it presents a high re-identification risk.
6.2 Merging a de-identified face with its original back-
ground
To date, most of the published face de-identification methods have focused on the
isolated face region in the original images [30], [43], [66], [119]. The result images
presented in the publications are composed of a de-identified face region and a blank
background (see Fig. 6.1b), which excludes hair, the ears, the forehead, the neck,
the rest of the human body and the shooting environment. However, real-world
applications always prefer a face with a background. As stated, the background here
means the rest of the human body and the shooting environment that outside the
face region. In the case of face de-identification, this leads to the demand of blending
the de-identified face region back onto its original image background.
One of the main challenges in this task is given by the noticeable differences
between the original and the de-identified faces regarding skin tone, illumination
condition, etc. Previous research in the fields of face swapping and image editing
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Fig. 6.2 Illustration for guided interpolation notations (adapted from [122])
has investigated similar problems and has provided several useful solutions to
this challenge. The study on face swapping in [120] used one recolouring method
followed by one relighting method to adjust the skin tone. Impett et al. [121] used
histogram matching in the RGB space to allow real-time operation. As the real-time
operation is not a priority at this stage, the more powerful but more time-consuming
method of Poisson seamless cloning [122] has been used in this work to achieve a
better visual quality of the blended images.
In the Poisson image editing [122], the source image can be interpolated to the
destination with a guided vector field. Let S ∈ R2 be the image definition domain
and letΩ be a closed subset of S with boundary ∂Ω. g denotes the source image and
V denotes a guidance vector field. The image blending task is to find an unknown
function f that interpolates in domain Ω the destination function f ∗, under the
guidance of vector field V . The unknown function f minimises
min
f
∬
Ω
∇ f − V 2 with f |∂Ω  f ∗ |∂Ω (6.1)
More specifically, in the task of margining the de-identified face to the background,
g is the isolated face image and S is the target background. To achieve the seamless
cloning, the guidance field V is a gradient field taken directly from g and (6.1)
becomes
min
f
∬
Ω
∇ f − ∇g2 with f |∂Ω  f ∗ |∂Ω (6.2)
which can be solved with the following Poisson equation with Dirichlet boundary
conditions:
∆ f  ∆g over Ω, with f |∂Ω  f ∗ |∂Ω (6.3)
where ∆·  ∂2·
∂x2 +
∂2·
∂y2 is the Laplace operator.
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Fig. 6.3 shows the results of two example faces. Fig. 6.3c also illustrates an
unexpected defect caused by the misalignment between the boundary of the source
image and the boundary of the destination area ∂Ω. The face de-identification
process changes not only the texture of a face but also the shape. Consequently, the
shape of the generated face might not fit with the original image background. This
means a simple replacement would not generate satisfying results. One approach to
this challenge could be warping the de-identified face texture to the original face
shape, where the shape of the original face would be recovered in the de-identified
image. However, the shape of a face contains rich personally identifiable information.
Bringing back the original face shape would significantly degrade the privacy
protection performance of a face de-identification system. Therefore, the new shape
of the de-identified face must be maintained in the final de-identified image. This
means that the background of the original face image has to be deformed to align
with the new shape of the face region. As described in Chapter 2, a face texture is
obtained through piece-wise affine warping, which triangulates the face image based
on the facial landmarks (see Fig. 3.2). Nevertheless, there are not well-defined points
in the background. In [47], the triangles of the background was defined with the
landmarks of the facial contour and eight additional anchor points on the edges and
corners of the image. This is an ad hoc approach because the transitions in between
pieces are discontinuous. It becomes noticeable when the area of the background is
increased.
The Moving Least Squares (MLS) image deformation method [123] is adopted
in this work to deform the image backgrounds, which can avoid triangulating the
input image and produce deformations that are globally smooth. MLS was used to
warp the background by solving the best affine transformation lv (x) that minimises,
for each given point v, ∑
i
wi
lv (p i ) − q i 2 (6.4)
where {p i} is a set of original points and {q i} is the target deformed positions of
{p i}.
wi 
1p i − v2α (6.5)
In the task of background deformation, {p i} and {q i} each is a set of facial contour
landmarks as defined in [62], [63] (see also Fig. 3.2). {p i} are the contour landmarks of
the face in the original image, and {q i} are the landmark positions of the de-identified
face. Prior to background deformation, the landmarks of the de-identified face were
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 6.3 Blending results of de-identified face regions. (a) Original face images.
(b) De-identified face region. (c) De-identified face image without background
deformation. (d) De-identified face image with background deformation.
firstly aligned to the original landmark through Procrustes analysis based on the
positions of the inner corners of the eyes and tip of the nose.
The employment of background deformation has two contributions to a face
de-identification system:
• Better visual quality of the de-identified face image. Poisson image blending
removes the noticeable colour difference in between the de-identified face
foreground and original image background. It increases the fidelity of the
result images. Fig. 6.3 shows the blending results of two de-identified faces
without and with background deformation. The last column shows the de-
identified faces with background deformation, where each de-identified face
has a shape different from its the original face while maintaining a similar skin
tone and illumination condition as its original face. When the de-identified face
region is narrower than its original face region (see the first row of Fig. 6.3), the
visual quality of bothwith andwithout background deformation are acceptable
in terms of the global colour tone and illumination condition. When the de-
identified shape boundary is wider than the original face shape boundary, the
guidance vector field is applied on the image background. As a result, the
original background fades into the face region following the gradient of the
de-identified face. As shown in the second row of Fig. 6.3, unexpected white
spots appear on the sides of the face.
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Table 6.1 Re-identification risk (%) of the de-identified face with and without
background deformation
Background
deformation
Crop size
300 × 300 200 × 200
w/o 71.24 10.80
w/ 54.83 1.25
Table 6.2 Key parameters of the face recognition methods used in the evaluation
experiments
Feature Parameter values Distance measurement
PCA – Euclidean distance
LBP radius = 1, neighbours = 8 Chi-squared distance
HOG cell = 10 × 10, orientations = 16 Cosine distance
LPQ cell = 10 × 10 Cosine distance
• Lower re-identification risk of the de-identified face images. When the original
face shape is retained, the de-identified image contains more PII information
that canbematchedwith the original image. Anexperiment has been conducted
to compare the re-identification risk of the resulting images with and without
background deformation. The image LBP feature was used in this experiment.
More details of the experiment and settings of parameters are described in
Section 6.3. Experimental results are given in Table 6.1, which shows that the
re-identification risks of images with background deformation are noticeably
lower than those without background deformation.
6.3 Re-identification risk test
To evaluate the privacy protection performance of the proposed method thoroughly,
further evaluation experiments have been conductedwith various face representation
models and distance measurements, including PCA (also known as Eigenface) [89],
LBP [97], HOG [27] and LPQ [99] features. The classifier in this re-identification
risk test is a kNN classifier which returns the rank-1 candidate with a given distance
measurement. Some key parameters of the face recognition methods used are shown
in Table 6.2.
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6.3.1 Types of attacks
In a closed environment where only the original images and their corresponding
de-identified images are presented, there are three types of re-identification attacks
that can be used to test the protection performance of a de-identification method [24].
Naïve recognition The original face images are used as the gallery and de-identified
face images as the probes.
Reverse recognition The de-identified face images are used as the gallery and the
original face images as the probes.
Parrot recognition When thede-identificationprocess canbe imitatedby the attacker
and the set of de-identified face images generated by the attacker is used as
probes to match with the released version of the de-identified face image set.
The following experiments evaluate the re-identification risks with naïve recog-
nition and reverse recognition. The parrot recognition does not work on either
k-Same-furthest or k-Diff-furthest method. As mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5, in
each iteration of k-Same/Diff-furthest face de-identification two clusters are formed
based on a randomly selected face. This means it is highly unlikely to repeat the
same random selections and produce the same set of de-identified faces.
6.3.2 Evaluation setup
A subset of the FERET face dataset [34] containing 962 subjects has been used in the
experiments. This subset was chosen from the available images of 994 subjects to
ensure that each subject has two colour frontal face images (‘fa’ and ‘fb’). ‘fa’ and
‘fb’ of each subject are from the same shooting session with slightly different facial
expressions. All the ‘fa’ faces were used as the gallery in the re-identification tests
to match against either the original version and the de-identified version of the ‘fb’
faces. Fig. 6.4 shows the original ‘fa’ (the first row), the original ‘fb’ (the second
row) and the de-identified ‘fb’ (the last row) images for five subjects from the chosen
FERET subset.
In this experiment, all the de-identified faces were generated with the same AAM,
which was trained on another subset from the FERET dataset. The AAM training
set was different from the gallery and probe set mentioned before. It contains
1952 colour images of frontal faces, and all of them are without glasses, beard or
moustache. The exclusion of such features has enabled the automatic removal of
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Fig. 6.4 Examples of faces (FERET dataset) used in re-identification tests
such non-identity related features through AAM representation (see Section 3.1.2 on
page 26). As a result, no faded glasses frame, beard or moustache would appear on
the resulting de-identified face images to degrade the visual quality of the image.
In addition, it was observed that the most significant texture feature in the trained
AAM describes merely the lighting condition of the images. To calibrate the lighting
condition, the most significant variance in the texture model was set to zero for all
the images represented in the face appearance model.
All face recognition systems isolate the face region from the background through
cropping and then extract the face features. Different crop settings are there for
face region cropping. Some systems crop the face region with a rectangular box
while some systems define the face region with facial contour landmarks, e.g. the
landmarks on the eyebrows and the jawline. In the re-identification tests, the face
imageswere first aligned to the facemean shapewhose size is approximately 200×200
pixels and then cropped by a rectangular box which is concentric with the mean
shape. The same crop setting was applied to both face images with background and
without background. Two different cropping sizes of either 200 × 200 or 300 × 300
pixels were applied on the images. Therefore, there are four difference cropped
images for each face image in both the gallery and the probe set. Fig. 6.5 shows some
example face images used in the following re-identification tests.
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Original fa Original fb De-id fb
w
/
BG
w
/o
BG
Fig. 6.5 Example of original and de-identified faces of one person with 200 pixels
and 300 pixels cropping sizes
6.3.3 Results and discussion
Table 6.4 presents the re-identification risk of the k-Diff-furthest method measured
in naïve recognition attacks using four different face recognition methods. Because
of the randomness in the face de-identification method, all the re-identification
risks in Table 6.4 are averages over 10 runs of k-Diff-furthest and are presented in
the format of mean accuracy ± standard deviation. Table 6.4a shows that without
merging to the original background the de-identified face regions generated by the
k-diff-furthest method always present a near zero re-identification risk for all the
face recognition methods tested.
Table 6.4b shows the re-identification risk increases when the de-identified face
region is blended with its original background. This is mainly because the Poisson
blending process has brought low-frequency information such as the skin-tone
and illumination of the original face image back to the de-identified face image.
Furthermore, the more the original background in a cropped face image, the higher
the re-identification risk will be. The risk values are under 7% and still acceptable
when the face images were cropped with a 200 × 200 square. However, the level
of re-identification risk increases rapidly when the face images were cropped with
a 300 × 300 square, indicating that the background areas around the face region
may also contain personally identifiable information and de-identification must also
be applied to these image areas to achieve complete privacy protection. Further
experiments have been conducted to evaluate the re-identification risk presented
by the background area alone. Results of these experiments are presented and
discussed in the next section.
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Table 6.3 Re-identification risk (%) of 300 × 300 inverse cropped face images
Feature
Probe set
Original De-id
PCA 56.39 31.82 ± 0.89
LBP 78.19 55.62 ± 0.68
HOG 53.27 27.07 ± 1.09
LPQ 60.44 32.88 ± 1.06
Table 6.5 shows the results of reverse recognition attacks, which gives the same
trends as the results of naïve recognition attacks. All the de-identified face images
yield a near zero re-identification risk when the background is excluded from the
image but a much higher risk when the background is included.
6.4 Image background attack to face de-identification
system
The re-identification tests in Section 6.3 show that the background area of an
original face image presents personal identifiable information and can increase the
re-identification risk when being blended with the de-identified face region. The
background area may contain not only the background environment of the original
image but also the hairstyle, the ear, the neck and the dressing style presented in the
original image.
The following experiment has been conducted to investigate the possibility of
using merely the background area of the original face image to attack a face de-
identification system. Fig. 6.6 shows some example images used in this experiment.
Background attack is a general attack to any face de-identification method that
modifies the face region only. The implementation of this attack is straightforward.
All the face images were applied with an inverse crop based on their facial landmarks
so that only the image area outside the face region was kept. The inverse crop has
been used in face recognition to compare the recognition performance between
human and computer [124], [125]. After inverse crop, the images were cropped
into the size of 300 × 300 for face recognition. The experimental results are shown
in Table 6.3. Comparing with the results shown in Table 6.4, it is clear that the
background area of the original image is the main contributor to the increase in the
re-identification risk.
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Fig. 6.6 Examples of inverse crop face images used in background attack experiment
6.5 Conclusions
To ensure the visual quality of a de-identified face image, the de-identified face
region has to be merged with its original background. This chapter investigated the
impact of this extract step on the re-identification risk.
Firstly, an approach was proposed to merge the isolated de-identified face with its
original image background. This approach can increase the fidelity and intelligibility
of the de-identified face images. The re-identification risk experiment results
show that the k-Diff-furthest face de-identification method provides high privacy
protection within the face region. However, blending the de-identified face to its
original background increases the re-identification risk. Although a face recognition
software focuses on the cropped face region, but the information contained in the
background area around the face region (e.g. hair colour, hairstyle, and dressing
style) also contribute to identify a person. The results of the re-identification attack
using only the background information confirmed that face region is sufficient but
not necessary for identifying a person. Face region information is the most efficient
information to facilitate face recognition. However, only de-identify this information
cannot stop the attacker from establishing re-identification using information such
as the background.
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Chapter 7
Open-set de-identification of faces in
videos with preservation of
expressions
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 and 5 have presented two novel face de-identification methods for the
protection of privacy. In the meantime, there are various needs for preserving data
utility of the de-identified faces in different real-world application scenarios such
as the monitoring of patients’ health status based on their facial expressions. This
chapter proposes a unified approach to address three challenges from the real-world
applications of face de-identification.
The first challenge is to maintain the facial expressions on the de-identified faces
because the facial expressions are the most important non-identity related
attributes on the face images and convey rich information. Face data are not
only saved as still images but also video sequences. When dealing with videos,
it is necessary to preserve not only the category but also the intensity of the
facial expressions during de-identification to ensure a nature display of face
dynamics afterwards.
The second challenge is an additional requirement from video data, where the
consistency of identities in a video must be maintained after de-identification.
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The third challenge is towards open-set face de-identification. The closed-set
scenario performs face de-identification to a set of face images anduses the given
image set as a gallery to train the feature space used by the de-identification
method. In contrast, the original identities of the face images to be de-identified
in an open-set scenario are not seen in the training phase [126]. Majority of
the real-world applications are dealing with an open-set problem while the
k-Same like face de-identification methods were designed for closed-set.
This chapter presents novel solutions to address all the three challenges men-
tioned above. In Section 7.2, a FET method is proposed to transfer the facial
expression through face feature subspace. This FET method can be combined with
previously described face de-identification methods and retain the facial motion
and expression from the original face to the de-identified face with minor impact
on the re-identification risk. In Section 7.3, an end-to-end face de-identification
system for video sequences is proposed. To this end, the FET method is extended
to video data to address additional identify consistency and open-set challenges.
Finally, evaluations on data utilities and re-identification risks of the de-identified
image and video data are presented in this chapter quantitatively and qualitatively.
Section 7.4 evaluates the performance of FET in face de-identification with datasets
of still images, and Section 7.5 tests the proposed end-to-end face de-identification
system with video data to evaluate its performance in terms of Action Unit (AU)
intensity preservation, identity consistency and privacy protection performance.
7.2 Facial expression transfer
Facial expression is one of the most important data utilities of face images which
often convey emotions. Ekman proposed six basic emotions which are interpreted
through facial expressions, namely anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness and
surprise [127]. However, the facial expression is not equivalent to emotion, and facial
expressions are not limited to six categories. In fact, the facial expression is dynamic
and complex, and it is a combination of facial muscle actions. It is necessary to be
accurate to the action level of each facial muscle to describe facial expressions. The
FACS [109] is one of the most common tools used to describe facial muscle actions.
The FACS defines atomic facial muscle actions as AUs. In FACS, facial expressions
are described as a combination of AUs (see Fig. 7.1). In the study of facial expression
analysis, AUs on human faces have been widely used to describe and analyse facial
expressions [128]–[131].
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AU 4: Brow lowerer
AU 7: Lid tightener
AU 12: Lip corner puller
AU 6: Cheek raiser
AU 10: Upper lip raiser
AU 9: Nose wrinkler
AU 43: Eyes closed
AU 25: Lips part
Fig. 7.1 An example showing the AUs associated with the expression of pain
Any procedure that blurs the facial expression in an image will degrade the
data utility of the images for machines and human observers. Examples of such
procedures include the ad hoc face de-identification methods (see Section 2.2) and
the k-Same-Pixel/Eigen method [24] due to the ‘ghost artefact’. k-Same-Select [29]
attempted to integrate utility preservation into face de-identification where data
utility classifiers are adopted, e.g. a gender or an expression classifier. The utility
classifier is used to split the original face set into several data utility biased subsets.
The standard de-identification process is then performed on each biased subset
separately. As a result, the de-identified images have the same utility bias as the
input images so that the information of the desired data utility is preserved. The
main drawback of this method is that it can preserve only the bias of the desired data
utility but not the variance. For binary data utility such as gender, this method has
been demonstrated to be adequate. For data utilities such as facial expressions, it is
necessary to preserve not only the category but also the intensity, and k-Same-Select
would fail in this circumstance. Furthermore, with the increasing number of data
utilities, the number of subsets increase exponentially.
The facial expression preservation is a challenging task because it needs to not
only guarantee the correct expression category but also retain the correct AU values.
It is even more challenging with video footages since any discontinuous facial
motions will look unnatural and can be easily spotted by a human observer.
7.2.1 Semantic analogies in the face feature space
As introduced in Section 3.1, the facial appearance model consists of a linear shape
model and a linear texture model of the face appearance. More specifically, both
shape and texture are PCA models and the principal components are orthogonal
within each model. Each dimension in the model feature space reflects a certain
variation in the model training set.
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There is a path can be found in the feature manifold corresponds to certain change
of the face appearance in the pixel space. When the face features of different identities
move towards the same direction in the feature space, their facial appearances in
the pixel space tend to have similar visual changes. This implies that the semantic
analogy of “king −man + woman  queen” can be found in the feature spaces of the
face appearance model.
Consider the transfer of facial expressions between two identities, where A is
the source identity and B is the target identity. γA and γB are two reference faces
of A and B which have the same expressions (e.g. neutral expression). Given the
representation of an arbitrary face appearance of identity A in the feature space γ′A,
the facial expression of γ′A can be mapped to γB through
γ′B  γ
′
A − γA + γB (7.1)
Equation (7.1) can also be applied to transfer other facial attributes, e.g. gender, head
pose, illumination condition. It is worth pointing out that, even for an attribute such
as gender, Equation (7.1) will not only transfer the category of the attribute (i.e. male
or female) but also the intensity of the attribute (i.e. how masculine/feminine a face
is).
7.2.2 Face de-identification with facial expression preservation
To achieve the preservation of facial expression in a de-identified face image. The
proposed FET process transfers the facial expression from an original face to its
de-identified face using the semantic analogy defined in (7.1). In this case, the
original face is the source and its de-identified face the target. This work always
uses neutral frontal faces as the references since all face de-identification processes
proposed in Chapter 4 and 5 deal with neutral frontal faces only. The FET process
can be described as follows
γ′d  γ
′ − γ + γd (7.2)
where γ′ is the feature vector of an input (original) expressive face image and γ is
the feature vector of the neutral frontal face of the same identity. γd is the feature
vector of the de-identified neutral frontal face generated by a model-based face
de-identification method such as k-Same-M, k-Same-furthest and k-Diff-furthest.
γ′d is the output from the de-identification system which is a de-identified face
with the same expression as γ′. Fig. 7.2 shows an example of k-Same-furthest face
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Neutral Expression Neutral Expression
(a) Original (b) De-identified
Fig. 7.2An example of transfer the expression from the original face to its de-identified
face
de-identification with FET. As demonstrated in Fig. 7.2, details of expression have
been transferred without altering the new identity.
7.3 Face de-identification in videos
Comparing with still images, the video footages contains dynamic information
about facial expressions and facial motions. This section proposes an approach that
employs the FET process to preserve facial expressions in the de-identified videos.
Let γ′(i) ∈ S be the face instances in a video sequence that are related to the same
identity. When the FET process defined in (7.2) is applied to the individual face
instances γ′(i), (7.2) can be re-written as
γ′(i)d  γ
′(i)
+
(
γd − γ
)
, (7.3)
where the feature vector γ represents the neutral frontal face of the original
identity defined by γ′(i) and γd represents the de-identified version of γ that is also
a neutral frontal face. The term (γd − γ) is referred to as the identity shift of the given
original identity as it reflects the changes of the given identity’s neutral face when it
shifts from the original identity to a new identity.
As stated, all γ′(i) ∈ S relate to the same identity and hence have the same γ.
Obviously, for identity consistency in the de-identified videos all γ′(i) ∈ S must
have an identical new identity γd. This means that to de-identify face instances
of a given identity, the face de-identification process only needs to calculate the
identity shift of the source identity once and apply the same identity shift to all the
face instances of the same source identity. In such way, face de-identification of the
given identity in a video can be achieved through a simple addition of the input
face instances and the calculated identity shift. In addition, the face de-identification
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Fig. 7.3 Overview of face de-identification with facial motion and expression preser-
vation in videos
approach for video defined in (7.3) is able to achieve both privacy protection and
preservation of facial expressions simultaneously: (a) the identity shift calculated by
an appropriate face de-identification method which guarantees the new identity
has a low re-identification risk; and (b) only the neutral frontal faces are used as
the identity reference which makes sure the FET process can transfer the facial
expression from original face to the de-identified face. Furthermore, this approach
inherently ensures identity consistency in the video after face de-identification as
the same identity shift is applied to the same person in each video frame.
Fig. 7.3 shows an end-to-end face de-identification system with an example video
input. Apart from the critical operations defined in (7.3), additional operations such
as background deformation and blending which mentioned in Chapter 6 have been
employed in the system to achieve better visual quality with the de-identified video.
The rest of this section describes the functional blocks in Fig. 7.3.
7.3.1 Calculation of identity shift
The identity shift defines the difference between the original neutral face γ and its de-
identified version γd. All the existing k-Same methods as well as the k-Diff-furthest
method operate with a set of face images and is not viable with an individual input
face image. Furthermore, the original neutral face γ is not always available in the
gallery in real-world applications (open-set) and searching for a neutral frontal face
in a video sequence is complicated and can be time-consuming. To resolve these
two issues, an additional person-specific set of neutral frontal faces is introduced in
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the proposed face de-identification system. The person-specific set contains only
neutral frontal face images which is used to provide identity references for unseen
face images, and it is named as the identity pool. For open-set applications where
the original neutral frontal face γ may be unavailable, the identity shift is calculated
using the following equation instead:
∆γ  γˆd − γˆ, (7.4)
where γˆ is the nearest face to γ found in the identity pool. The corresponding
de-identified face set of the identity pool is generated offline using the k-Diff-furthest
method in a single pass. Although the de-identified identity pool can be generated
using any face de-identification method, the k-Diff-furthest has been used here to
maintain the diversity among the de-identified neutral faces. The identity shift ∆γ
for each face (or identity) in the identity pool is also calculated offline to increase
the process efficiency of the proposed system. To minimise the initial delay of the
system in a time-critical application such as video streaming, the de-identification
system uses the first available video frame of a person’s face to establish a link with
the identity pool.
7.3.2 Feature normalisation and retainment of the original head
pose
The proposed approach uses a generic face appearance model to make sure it is
capable of accurately representing any face instance in the input video. The generic
face appearance model is trained with face images of various head poses, facial
expressions and illumination conditions. As a result, in the trained model, the
first two shape components represent the pitch and yaw rotations of a face; while
the first three texture components represent the illumination conditions of a face
image. Considering that illumination and head pose have a noticeable impact on the
accuracy of face recognition, the illumination, pitch and yaw of γ′(1) (the first instance
of γ′(i)) is normalised before searching for its nearest face γˆ in the identity pool. This
normalisation is achieved by setting the parameters of the above-mentioned model
feature components to zero.
The same normalisation has also been applied to the identity pool such that the
identity shift generated using (7.4) will not alter illumination, pitch and yaw rotations
of a face. Hence, through the calculation of (7.3), all these characteristics of an
original face γ′(i) will be automatically mapped to its de-identified version of γ′(i)d .
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Two of the head motions are not mentioned in the feature normalisation, which are
translation and roll. In this work, the translation and roll of γ′(i) are restored in γ′(i)d
through Procrustes analysis based on three facial landmarks, explicitly the inner
corners of the eyes and the tip of the nose. The retainment of original illumination
and head pose makes the whole video frame look much smoother and more natural
when the de-identified face region is merged with the original image background.
7.3.3 Implementing texture transfer in pixel space
In previous sections, the FET process is executed in themodel feature space. However,
the PCA process for establishing the face appearance model is not lossless. As a
result, the information which the face appearance model cannot represent will be
lost when a face appearance is represented in the model space. For example, there
are not eye gaze variations in the face appearance model training set in the following
experiments, so the appearance model cannot represent eye gaze. The eye gaze
information will lose when the FET process is conducted in the feature space (see
Fig. 7.4b).
In the face appearance model, the shape and texture of a face can be represented
and processed separately. Therefore, considering (3.11), the identity shift ∆γ is able
to be split into shape shift ∆α and texture shift ∆β. According to (3.8a), the shape of
the de-identified face appearance s′d is given by
s′d  s¯ +Φs (α′ + ∆α) (7.5)
Similarly, according to (3.9a), the de-identified face texture through FET in feature
space is given by
t′d  t¯ +Φt
(
β′ + ∆β
)
(7.6)
The texture information loss happens when using β′ representing t′. If the FET is
executed in pixel space, all the texture detail will be retained and (7.6) becomes
t′d  t
′
+Φt · ∆β (7.7)
whereΦt · ∆β converts the feature identity shift into image pixels and only needs to
be calculated once when de-identifying a video sequence.
Fig. 7.4 compares the results of the FET when conducting texture transfer in
feature space and pixel space with three example video frames. As shown, the
de-identified video frame generated through texture transfer in the pixel space
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(a
)
(b
)
(c
)
Fig. 7.4 Comparison of texture transfer in feature and pixel space. (a) the original
video frame; (b) the de-identified video frame whose texture has been transferred in
the model feature space; (c) the de-identified video frame whose texture has been
transferred in raw pixel space. (b) and (c) are using the same de-identified face shape
which is different from (a). (c) contains more texture details of (a), e.g. wrinkles and
gaze.
looks more natural than the one generated in the feature space. Because the second
approach does not filter the original face textures with a face appearance model, any
details such as amole or a scar on the face will be passed from the original image to its
de-identified image and increase the re-identification risk. The re-identification risk
of the de-identified images produced by these two different approaches is evaluated
and compared in Section 7.5.
7.4 Evaluate face de-identification with FET on still im-
ages
The experiments in this section extend the re-identification risk evaluation in
Chapter 4 and evaluates the proposed FET process with the IMM dataset [117].
The dataset contains still images of 40 subjects. Only images with a near-frontal
head pose were used. These include a neutral, a happy and an arbitrary expression
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Fig. 7.5 Re-identification risk comparison of k-Same-M-Select and k-Same-furthest
with FET
face images per subject. The following experiments aim to compare the facial
expression preservation performance between k-Same-Select [29] and the proposed
k-Same-furthest with FET. Because all the face de-identification methods in this
experiment are face appearance model-based, the name k-Same-M-Select is used
here to distinguish from the original k-Same-Select which is the Pixel/Eigen-based
solution.
7.4.1 Evaluation of re-identification risk
The re-identification risk was evaluated through face recognition experiments
measuring Euclidean distance in the AAM feature space. In each run of the
experiments, 70% of the subjects were randomly selected and the near-frontal face
images of these selected subjects were cropped and then used to train an AAM face
appearance model. In the test phase, the original near-frontal face images of all the
subjects were cropped and used as the gallery and their de-identified images as the
probes. All the results reported here are averages over ten runs of the experiment.
Fig. 7.5 shows the rank-1 re-identification risks of the cropped original faces
against their de-identified faces generated by model-based k-Same-Select and by
k-Same-furthest with and without FET. The re-identification risk of k-Same-M-Select
stay slightly below the theoretical upper bound 1/k. As proved and tested in
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Fig. 7.6 Comparison of facial expression classification on the de-identified faces
Chapter 4, k-Same-furthest without the FET process produces a re-identification
risk of zero in the appearance model feature space regardless of the value of k. The
re-identification risk of the k-Same-furthest with FET is near zero regardless of k,
indicating that the FET process after k-Same-furthest de-identification has hardly
any impact on the privacy protection performance of the proposed system.
7.4.2 Evaluation of data utility
Following the evaluation of k-Same-Select in [29], the data utility preservation ability
of the k-Same-furthest with FET method was measured in terms of the accuracy of a
facial expression classifier. A LDA model was employed as the expression classifier.
The LDA classifier was trained with original face images displaying neutral and
happiness expressions. This classifier was then tested with the de-identified happy
faces generated by model-based k-Same-Select and the k-Same-furthest with FET,
respectively. Fig. 7.6 compares the classification accuracies of the two approaches. As
shown, the k-Same-furthest with FETmethod can retainmore expression information
than the k-Same-Select method. In addition, the k-Same-Select does not distinguish
the intensity of the facial expressions, while different levels of happiness may
present on different faces. Synthesising the de-identified face as an aggregation,
the expression information on different faces may cancel out each other and be
lost from their de-identified faces. This leads an information loss on the facial
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expressions. In contrast, the proposed approach transfers the original expression
after the de-identification process, aiming tomake the output face display an identical
expression to the original. Hence when the output faces are classifiedwith a classifier
trained with the original expressions, it is more likely for the classifier to detect the
expression cloned by k-Same-furthest-FET. Fig. 7.6 confirms that applying FET after
k-Same-furthest face de-identification preserves expression category better than
k-Same-Select.
7.5 Evaluate face de-identification with FET on video
data
The evaluation experiments on face de-identification with FET was conducted with
the video sequences from the UNBC-McMaster Shoulder Pain Expression Archive
Database [132]. The UNBC-McMaster database contains 200 video sequences of the
faces of 25 subjects, where faces in each video all relate to the same subject. 184 video
sequences were selected from the database to make sure a complete face with the
full set of 68 facial landmarks can be detected in each frame. There are 238 frames
per video on average.
To enable accurate representation of the faces in the identity pool as well as those
in the test video sequences, a generic appearance model was trained with 1952 near
frontal faces from the FERET dataset. The appearance model training data present
various facial expressions, illumination and small head poses and are without glasses
or heavy facial hair. In the trained appearance model, 8 shape components are
kept to represent 90% of the shape variance within the training set and 59 texture
components for 90% of the texture variance. Furthermore, the identity pool was
composed of 780 near neutral faces from the FERET dataset [34] that are also near
frontal. Before applying face de-identification to video sequences, de-identification of
the identity pool is carried out offline in a single pass. The evaluations on data utility,
identity consistency and re-identification risks of the proposed face de-identification
method in the video are presented in the following subsections.
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Fig. 7.7 The mean absolute errors of OpenFace AU detection results of the original
frames and the de-identified frames, in comparison with the AU intensity ground
truth provided by UNBC-McMaster dataset [132].
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7.5.1 Preservation of facial expressions
The UNBC-McMaster dataset contains the ground truth of 9 AUs including brow-
lowering (AU4), cheek-raising (AU6), eyelid tightening (AU7), nose wrinkling (AU9),
upper-lip raising (AU10), oblique lip raising (AU12), horizontal lip stretch (AU20),
lips parting (AU25) and jaw-dropping (AU26), where the intensity of each AU has
been scored manually as an integer from 0 to 6 inclusively. To test the expression
preservation performance of the proposed system, the intensity level of each AU is
compared between the original video frames and their corresponding de-identified
frames. The AU intensities of a video frame were measured by OpenFace [131],
which generates AU intensity as real numbers.1
Fig. 7.7 shows the mean absolute difference between the AU intensities calculated
by OpenFace and the ground truth for the original video frames as well as the
de-identified frames generated in the pixel space and the model feature space,
respectively. The difference values are averaged over all the 43 734 test video frames.
Fig. 7.7 shows that, apart from AU7 eyelid tightener and AU10 upper lip raiser, the
AU intensity values of the de-identified frames have remained almost the same
as their original frames. For AU10, the AU intensity values predicted from the
de-identified video frames are closer to the ground truth than their original video
frames. Even in the worst case of AU7, the AU intensity has remained within the
same integer level after face de-identification.
As shown by the blue bars in Fig. 7.7, OpenFace is not always accurate, and there
are some AUs harder to predict than the others. Therefore, a further AU comparison
is performed to test with only the frames that OpenFace can predict correctly, i.e.
when the rounded-up value of OpenFace’s prediction matches with the ground truth.
Table 7.1 shows the comparison results. Again, there is hardly any change in AU
intensity for AU9 nose wrinkler and AU20 lip stretcher. The highest difference is still
with AU7 but at a negligible level of 0.3 out of 6. Example video frames are included
in Table 7.1 to demonstrate the visual impact of the average intensity difference
obtained for each AU. As seen from these example frames, there is hardly any visual
difference in the facial expressions before and after applying face de-identification.
1https://github.com/TadasBaltrusaitis/OpenFace
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Table 7.1 Average absolute difference in AU intensity between original frames and
corresponding de-identified frames, with example frames demonstrating that the
average difference with each AU.
AU intensity difference
Example frames
Original De-identified
AU4 0.148
AU6 0.232
AU7 0.302
AU9 0.060
AU10 0.260
AU12 0.215
AU20 0.077
AU25 0.135
AU26 0.166
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 7.8 Examples of the cropped and resized face images used in the identity
consistency test
7.5.2 Identity consistency of the de-identified videos
Each UNBC-McMaster video sequence contains face instances of only one person.
The following experiment aimed to evaluate the identity consistency within each
de-identified video, i.e. to test whether the face instances within a de-identified video
still relate to the same identity. The face images used in this experiment have been
cropped out, aligned with the inner corners of the eyes and the tip of the nose, and
resized to 100 × 100 (see Fig. 7.8). The face recognition used LBPu28,2 face feature [97]
and conducted a 10-fold cross validation on the de-identified faces.
The identity consistency was tested sequence-wise firstly. Each video sequence
was de-identified independently. The result shows that 99.98% of the de-identified
faces were matched with another de-identified face from the same video sequence
at rank-1. The identity consistency was then tested across videos. The original
videos were first grouped according to their identities given by the dataset and
then the same identity shift was used to de-identify all the videos in the same group.
The 10-fold cross validation result shows that 99.99% of the de-identified faces are
top-rank matched as another de-identified face from the same identity group, where
97.57% of the correct matches are found within the same video sequence and 2.43%
from another video sequence of the same person.
7.5.3 Privacy protection performance
The de-identification process of the identity pool can be performed with any face de-
identificationmethod and three face de-identificationmethodswere tested, including
the k-Diff-furthest method, k-Same method and face swapping method. The face
swapping method followed the work of [50], [120], where Rank-i face swapping
replaces an original face with its ith closest face chosen from an identity pool of size
n. The identity pool consists of n  780 person-specific faces from the FERET dataset.
All 43 734 original faces extracted from the UNBC-McMaster videos plus the identity
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pool were used to form the face gallery in the re-identification test. The identity
pool was included in the gallery to increase the number of subjects. Otherwise, the
re-identification risk even by random matching would be 1 out of the 25 subjects
of the UNBC-McMaster database. Eigenfaces [89] and LBP [97] face recognition
methods were used to match the de-identified faces of the UNBC-McMaster videos
with those in the face gallery. For each face de-identification method being tested, all
the 43 734 de-identified faces before Poisson blending and background merging have
been used as the probe images. Again, the face regions are cropped out, aligned and
resized to 100 × 100.
Table 7.2 shows the rank-1 re-identification risk of the de-identified faces and
compares the privacy protection performance of the three face de-identification
methods mentioned above as well as the two texture transfer approaches described
in Section 7.3.3. Rank-1 re-identification risk in Table 7.2 relates to the cases when a
de-identified video frame has been matched with any frame from its original video
sequence.
Results in Table 7.2 show that when implementing identity shift in the feature
space all the tested face de-identificationmethods have been able to provide sufficient
privacy protection against similarity-based face recognition software. Transferring
face texture in the pixel space gives the de-identified faces more original visual
details. However, as expected, it sacrifices the privacy protection performance as
more original face texture details such as wrinkles and facial hair are also transferred
to the de-identified faces.
As shown in Table 7.2, the k-Diff-furthest method has outperformed the k-Same
method in both FET through the feature space and the pixel space. The performance
of Rank-1 face swapping is comparable to that of k-Same. With the identity pool
of 780 faces, the performance of k-Diff-furthest is comparable to Rank-200 face
swapping. Rank-n face swapping has generated the lowest re-identification risk.
However, Rank-n face swapping tends to choose the few outliers in the identity pool
to replace the original faces. In the experiments, Rank-n has used only 14 identities
to de-identify the entire identity pool of 780 identities with 625 identities (80%)
sharing the same 5 new identities. The mechanism of the k-Diff-furthest method
guarantees that each original face is replaced with a unique de-identified face and
the set of de-identified faces remains as diverse and distinguishable as the original
set. Furthermore, both k-Same and k-Diff-furthest methods replace an original face
with a synthesised face while the other three face swapping methods use a natural
face appearance chosen from an identity pool.
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Table 7.2 Rank-1 re-identification risk (%) of the de-identified video frames
Texture
transfer in
Re-id
feature
De-identification method
k-Same k-Diff-f Rank-1 Rank-200 Rank-n
feature space PCA 3.83 2.56 4.78 2.67 0.51LBP 2.66 1.29 1.98 1.74 0.95
pixel space PCA 23.28 16.76 21.20 19.29 4.66LBP 20.95 13.59 19.36 13.09 8.33
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter introduces a FET process to the face de-identification system to preserve
facial motions and expressions. The proposed FET can map the dynamic changes on
the original faces to the de-identified faces so that not only the categories of the facial
expression but also the intensities of the facial AUs can be preserved. The expression
preservation performance of the proposed k-Same-furthest with FET outperforms
the k-Same-Select. The FET is an additional step to the face de-identification method,
and the experimental results show that the FET has a negligible impact on the
re-identification risk. The FET can help extend the face de-identification methods
that have been designed for image set to video data. The second part of this chapter
proposed an efficient approach that achieves privacy protection and preservation
of facial expressions simultaneously through the simple operation of adding a
pre-calculated identity shift to the original face instances in the input video. The use
of the same identity shift for each subject in the original videos guarantees identity
consistency in the de-identified video sequences. It also allows the dynamics of facial
expressions presented in an original video to be preserved in the de-identified video.
Last but not least, as the neutral frontal face of the original face identities are not
always available, this chapter introduced the new concept of identity pool which is
used to estimate the neutral frontal face of an unseen identity using an existing face
image dataset. Such a method can extend face de-identification from the closed-set
to open-set.
Chapter 8
Appearance model-based GAN for
face de-identification
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7, an efficient face de-identification system has been proposed for videos.
The proposed system achieves both privacy protection and preservation of facial
expressions and head motions through a simple approach of calculating the identity
shift caused by de-identifying the neutral frontal face of a subject and then adding
the same identity shift to all the face instances of the same subject in the given video
sequence(s). This approach was then extended to open-set face de-identification
where the neutral frontal face of the subject to be de-identified is unseen (i.e. not
available in the system gallery of known subjects). This extension to open-set has
been achieved by finding an estimate neutral frontal face of the target subject and
using the identity shift of the estimate in the calculation, where the estimate is chosen
from an identity pool. Obviously, to ensure a close resemblance can be found for
any given subject, the identity pool must contain an adequate number of neutral
frontal faces and there must be rich diversity among these faces. Establishing such
an identity pool tends to be difficult due to the requirements mentioned above and
the ethical reasons and is meant to be time-consuming. However, generative models
have provided an effective and economical way to solve this problem by generating
face images of artificial identities based on existing data.
Face image synthesis is an effective approach to investigate the face feature
subspace. It is also a pre-processing step in many face recognition systems for head
pose or facial expression normalisation. Majority work has investigated the feature
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manifold (subspace). The statistical models such as AAM [58] and 3DMM [59]
show that different face images can be reconstructed by manipulating the low-
dimensional features in the model feature space. Huang et al. [133] proposed a
manifold estimation method to synthesise face images with different head poses
from one single image. Sagonas et al. [134] proposed a face frontalisation model
using a statistical model of frontal face images.
With the rapid development and success of deep neural networks in recent years,
the task of generating face image is now mainly completed by employing neural
network-based approaches such as a VAE or a GAN architecture.
In this Chapter, the GAN architecture is employed to generate neutral frontal
face images for the formation of a diverse identity pool. In general, the generator
in a GAN architecture is trained to map a noise distribution to the distribution of
face image pixels. Due to the complexity of this task, the performance of a GAN
is not always ideal. The output images often present a distorted human face with
low resolution despite the complex network architecture and the massive training
set used. In order to address these issues, this Chapter introduces an Appearance
Model-based GAN (AMGAN), where a statistical face appearancemodel is employed
at the input of the GAN with the aim to reduce the complexity of the GAN learning
task through transforming the input data from the pixel space to the appearance
model feature space. As a result, the GAN is able to generate the required appearance
model parameters using shallow Multilayer Perceptrons (MLPs) and the generated
model parameters can be used to construct 200 × 200 high-quality face images.
Furthermore, facial attributes have been used as conditions during the training
procedure. By doing so, the generator is able to generate a face appearance from
given semantic descriptions, i.e. the generated face images can have certain facial
attributes such as facial expression as specified in the given description. An identity
pool has been constructed with the proposed AMGAN and applied to the face de-
identification system described in Chapter 7. The re-identification risk experiment
shows that the generated data can replace the real data and provides comparable
protection performance.
8.2 Generative Adversarial Networks
Goodfellow et al. proposed the concept of GANs [135] and it has become the most
popular training strategy for generative models. As shown in (8.1), GANs contain
two adversarial models, a generative model G and a discriminative model D. In
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the context of GANs, both G and D are neural networks. D examines data samples
to determine whether they are real or fake, while G tries to fool D by producing
random samples that comply with the distribution of the given real ones. The
training process of a GAN is a zero-sum or minimax two-player game between its G
and its D, which is typically defined by
min
G
max
D
V(D ,G)  Ex∼pdata(x)
[
logD(x)] + Ez∼pz(z) [log(1 − D(G(z)))] , (8.1)
where x is the real data complying with distribution pdata and z is random noise
sampled from distribution pz . The models G and D are trained through alternative
optimisation, where parameters of D are optimised to maximise the objective
function (i.e. increase the probability of classifying a real/fake sample correctly)
and parameters of G are optimised to minimise the objective function (i.e. decrease
the probability of classifying a fake sample correctly). Both models get optimised
until an equilibrium is established. The equilibrium is a saddle point of the objective
function.
One of the most popular applications of adversarial networks is the creation
of realistic-looking images. The first proposed GAN architecture [135] is able to
create images of simple objects such as hand-written digits. However, for more
complicated objects such as animals, these early GANs create fuzzy images when
learning from the CIFAR-10 dataset. The work of Deep Convolutional Generative
Adversarial Network (DCGAN) [136] proposed by Radford et al. was a breakthrough
on image generation using GANs, where CNN architecture was used for both the
generator and the discriminator, and it has become a popular architecture that has
been used in many following models. However, GANs are often trained using
gradient decent methods that have been designed to minimise a loss function. When
used to search for a Nash equilibrium, these methods make the training of a GAN
unstable and fail to converge. Salimans et al. [137] have provided suggestions to
improve the training convergence and the quality of the generated data, including
minibatch discrimination, one-sided label smoothing and inception scores. Another
contribution of their work was that they further divided the set of real samples
into k classes. Instead of a binary (real or fake) classification, they trained their
discriminator to perform a k + 1 classification and suggested that using the class
labels of real samples on the discriminator side to conduct the semi-supervised
learning could enable the model to learn recognisable features of the classes and
help improve the visual quality of the generated data.
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Often there is a need to control specific attributes of the synthesised samples, e.g.
gender or head pose of the synthesised faces. Conditional GANs (cGANs) [138] has
been proposed for this purpose. Equation (8.1) can be extended to cGANs by adding
data labels as conditions c to both the generator and the discriminator, as shown
in (8.2).
min
G
max
D
V(D ,G)  Ex ,c∼pdata(x ,c)
[
logD(x , c)]
+ Ez∼pz(z),c∼pdata(c)
[
log(1 − D(G(z , c), c))] (8.2)
The Auxiliary Classifier GAN (AC-GAN) [139] uses the class labels of the real
data to train an auxiliary classifier on the outputs of the discriminator so that the
discriminator can not only examine the real/fake data but also classify the given
samples. Instead of class labels, images have been used as the conditional inputs to
the multiple generators in the LAPGAN network [140].
There have several GAN variants work been proposed to generate face images.
They have been demonstrated their performance in generating face images from
random noise distribution [135], [136], [141]–[145]. More recently, Karras et al.[146]
generated high-quality facial images with an incremental growth GAN. Furthermore,
data labels have been used to control the outputs of a GAN, e.g. certain attributes
of the output face images. Larsen et al.[147] used the VAE/GAN model to learn
the latent representation of an input face image. In their work, the attributes
are manipulated in the latent space, and a decoder generates the image for the
discriminator. Invertible Conditional GANs [148] use the cGANs architecture. In
addition, they trained two encoders to map the input face images to latent space and
attribute labels. Age-cGAN proposed by Antipov et al. [149] is able to generate face
images of 6 difference age groups for the same identity. Huang et al. [150] generate
frontal faces from profile faces with a Two-Pathway GAN in which the generator
takes both global facial image and local patches.
Apart from investigating on the network architectures, researchers have also
worked on the training loss in order to achieve a better training performance, e.g. to
solve the gradient vanishing problem. Equation (8.1) is used for theoretical analysis.
In practice, the discriminator and the generator optimise their loss function L(D) and
L(G) defined in (8.3), respectively. L(G) is not in the flip sign form of L(D) but a flip
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target form. Thus, the training process is no longer a zero-sum game.
L(D)
(
θ(D), θ(G)
)
 −12Ex∼pdata(x) logD(x) −
1
2Ez∼pz(z) log(1 − D(G(z)))
L(G)  −12Ez∼pz(z) logD(G(z)),
(8.3)
Least Squares GAN (LSGAN) proposed by Mao et al. [142] minimises the loss
function in Pearson χ2 divergence instead of KL divergence, where loss functions of
D and G are defined as
L(D)LSGAN 
1
2Ex∼pdata(x)
[
(D(x) − b)2
]
+
1
2Ez∼pz(z)
[
(D(G(z)) − a)2
]
L(G)LSGAN 
1
2Ez∼pz(z)
[
(D(G(z)) − c)2
]
,
(8.4)
where a and b are the labels for fake data and real data, respectively. Moreover, c is
the value that G wants D to believe for fake data, in our experiments they are set as
a  0 and b  c  1.
Arjovsky et al. proposed Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) [143] which optimises the
loss functions in the Earth-Mover distance and the loss function can be written
as Equation (8.5). Weight clipping is applied to the weights during training, to
satisfy the condition that the discriminator must lie within the space of 1-Lipschitz
functions,
L(D)WGAN  −Ex∼pdata(x) [D(x)] + Ez∼pz(z) [D(G(z))]
L(G)WGAN  −Ez∼pz(z) [D(G(z))] ,
(8.5)
However, Gulrajani et al. [144] demonstrated that weight clipping might cause
undesired behaviour, and they proposed Wasserstein GAN with gradient penalty
(WGAN-GP) to address this problem. The loss functions for G and D is shown
in (8.6).
L(D)WGAN-GP  −Ex∼pdata(x) [D(x)] + Ez∼pz(z) [D(G(z))] + λExˆ∼pxˆ
[
(∥∇xˆD(xˆ)∥2 − 1)2
]
︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
gradient penalty
L(G)WGAN-GP  −Ez∼pz(z) [D(G(z))] ,
(8.6)
where xˆ is sampled randomly between real data x and generated data, and λ is the
penalty coefficient.
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Fig. 8.1 Overview of the AMGAN
8.3 Appearance Model-based GAN
Using a DCGAN architecture can generate realistic and high-quality face images,
but it requires a significant amount of computational resource and time [146]. To
simplify the face image generating task, the prior work of face landmark detection is
used to allocate the face region and build a face appearance model through linear
transformations. Instead of using images, the appearance model parameters are used
for the following GAN learning. Because the dimension of inputs is significantly
reduced through PCA, the adversarial training task can be completed with two
shallow networks. An AMGAN is proposed in this section. Furthermore, two
GAN architectures and training schemes are discussed with the aim of controlling
certain attributes of the generated face images. At the end of this section, the
proposed AMGAN is used to generate the identity pool of face images for the face
de-identification system.
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8.3.1 Network architecture
As shown in Fig. 8.1, during the training phase, all the pixel-based face images are
first fed into a pre-trained appearance model and represented in the model feature
space as a set of parameters. The model parameters of all the real images in the
training set are used to form the prior probability distribution pdata(x). The generator
in the system is trained to map a noise distribution pz(z) to the prior distribution
pdata(x). The generator and the discriminator in the proposed GAN system are two
shallow MLP networks because the dimensionality of the network input data has
been significantly reduced through the appearance model. The generator takes a
uniformly distributed noise as the inputs while the input to the discriminator can be
either the scaled appearance model parameters of real face images or the generated
parameters from the generator. In cGAN architecture, both the G and D take a
condition vector c ∈ Rn as a second input. The discriminator distinguishes whether
the input samples are from the real data prior or the distribution estimated by G.
In the GAN with auxiliary loss architecture, the output of D is not a single value
but a n + 1 dimensional vector. The first value of the output is used to compute
a regular GAN loss and the rest to compute an auxiliary loss. As mentioned, all
the data samples used in the AMGAN training are not at the image pixel level but
the appearance model parameter level. When the training is completed, the model
parameters generated by the trained G are projected back into the pixel space to
produce images.
8.3.2 Appearance model parameter pre-processing
The face appearance model represents face images in model subspace as face features.
Each real data sample x for the GAN is a concatenation of normalised model
parameters. The shape and texture model parameters are firstly normalised with
the corresponding eigenvalues λ and then downscaled with a scalar a. In a normal
distribution, 99.7% of the data are within ±3√λ. A value greater than 3 for a is
recommended to downscale the feature value to around [−1, 1]. Overall, the rescaled
feature vector x of a real image is calculated as
x 
1
a
diag ©­«
[
λs
λt
]− 12ª®¬
[
α
β
]
(8.7)
106 Appearance model-based GAN for face de-identification
Then the rescaled feature vectors of the real images are used along with random
noise samples z to conduct the training of the GAN.
8.3.3 Attribute-controlled face synthesis
The aim of including GAN in this project is to overcome the lack of data problem
and generate an artificial identity pool for the face de-identification system. To
control certain attributes of the outputs of a generator, data labels are required to
feed into the generator as additional information. Some face dataset provides facial
attribute labels which describe certain characteristics on the corresponding face
images, e.g. gender, age, expression, and face shape, etc. Two types of face attribute
labels are considered in the following experiments, namely the categorical label and
the continuous label.
Categorical label: The labels provided by the dataset which contains binary classes
of each attribute, e.g. the CelebA dataset [151] provides 40 binary face attributes
per image. Positive is marked as 1 and negative is marked as −1.
Continuous label: The labels are not binary but continuous intensity values of each
class. e.g. LFW dataset [152] provides the intensity values of 73 face attributes
which are detected by a facial attribute classifier [153].
As mentioned, the appearance model parameters are normalised and rescaled in
the way described in Section 8.3.2. It is necessary to normalise the attribute labels
to the same range, e.g. the interval of [−1, 1] is used in the following experiments.
Pre-processed label values are used in the both of generator and discriminator as the
condition values.
Conditional GAN
One approach to using the conditions in the GAN training is the cGAN archi-
tecture [138] which is shown in Fig. 8.1a. The cGAN architecture combines the
condition values c ∈ Rn with the inputs to G and D while the outputs of G and
D are same as when train the GAN without conditions. The objective function of
cGAN is shown in (8.2), while in practice, it has been split into the generator loss
and discriminator loss and adapted with LSGAN, WGAN and WGAN-GP. The x,
z and G(z) in (8.4), (8.5) and (8.6) are replaced by
[
x
c
]
,
[
z
c
]
and
[
G(z)
c
]
respectively.
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Essentially, the discriminator is modelling a joint distribution of real/generated data
and conditions.
Auxiliary losses for conditions
Another approach to using the conditions is that the discriminator does not take
the conditions as the inputs but an auxiliary classification/regression task to help
the model learn the conditional values. It is similar to AC-GAN architecture, but
the auxiliary loss needs to be redefined instead of using multi-class classification
loss. The discriminator outputs n + 1 logits where n is the size of the condition
values and y ∈ Rn are the logits which are used in the auxiliary task in the following
descriptions. The overall losses of generator and discriminator are composed by two
parts,
L  LGAN + λLaux (8.8)
where LGAN represents both generator loss and discriminator loss in all above
mentioned GAN losses. Laux is the auxiliary loss and it is computed differently
depend on the type of the attribute label. λ is the auxiliary loss coefficient and it is
set to λ  1 in the following experiments.
• For the categorical label, the auxiliary task is essentially a multi-label classifica-
tion. Both the logits y and the condition values c need to be mapped to the
interval of [0, 1] using
p  H(c)
pˆ  S(y) (8.9)
where H is the Heaviside step function and S is the sigmoid function. The
auxiliary loss for categorical label is
Laux  − 1n
n∑
i1
[
pi log pˆi + (1 − pi) log(1 − pˆi)
]
(8.10)
• For the continuous label, the auxiliary loss is the mean squared error between
the logits y from the discriminator and the conditional values c,
Laux 
1
2n ∥y − c∥
2 (8.11)
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8.3.4 Generating the identity pool with an AMGAN
As mentioned in Chapter 7, the identity pool for the face de-identification system
must consist of neutral frontal face images ideally with appropriate illumination.
Although attribute labels have been used to control certain attributes of the face
images produced by the generator, some attributes such as head pose and image
brightness are not controlled. In addition, the real images used to train the AMGAN
are from in-the-wild image sets and present various head poses and illumination
conditions. This means the generated face images cannot be added directly into
the identity pool without selection. A group of two filters have been designed for
automatic identity pool candidate selection. The filters examine the generated model
parameters in two aspects, explicitly, head pose and image fidelity. The identity pool
only accepts the samples which can pass both filters.
Head pose: As mentioned, in the trained shape model the first two dimensions
represent the head pitch angles and yaw angles. The frontal face should have
small parameter values along these two dimensions. Therefore, a generated
model parameter vector is dropped if any of its first two shape parameters is
greater than the square root of their corresponding eigenvalues
√
λs1 and
√
λs2.
Image fidelity: The classification scores from the discriminator are used to filter
the generated data to ensure identity pool only contains the images with high
visual quality. Although the discriminator in the GAN is not guaranteed to
be the optimal solution for distinguishing real and fake data, the high score
samples tend to provide realistic looking face images and hence used as the
valid candidates for the identity pool.
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8.4 Experiments
8.4.1 Datasets
LFW [152] and CelebA [151] datasets have been considered as the training set for the
experiments in this chapter. For experiments on cGANs, both datasets have been
used in the tests as they provide different types of attribute labels. For experiments
on GANs without conditional inputs, only CelebA dataset has been used as the
training set as both datasets contain data of similar natures while CelebA dataset
contains more images than LFW dataset. All the facial landmarks were detected
by CLNF [40], [131] face landmark detector since neither of these datasets provides
facial landmark ground truth.1 Images that CLNF has failed to detect a full set of
68 landmarks are excluded from the respective training set. As a result, the LFW
training set has all the 13 114 images in the original LFW dataset and the CelebA
training set has 198 765 out of 202 599 images from the original CelebA dataset.
All the images in the training set are aligned with a 200 × 200 mean shape based
on the facial landmarks. The same as previous chapters, the appearance model
used in the AMGAN has been trained with the same 1952 frontal face images from
the FERET dataset. The trained appearance model contains 10 shape components
and 147 texture components, representing 95% shape variance and 95% texture
variance. It is worth noting that the training data of the appearance model are the
frontal face images which are different from the in-the-wild face images used to
train the AMGAN. Therefore, when transferring the in-the-wild image data into the
pre-trained appearance model space, some dimensions would present higher data
variances than other dimensions. For example, the LFW/CelebA image dataset has
a variance higher than the corresponding eigenvalue in the second dimension of the
shape model, which represents the head rotation (see Fig. 8.2). In this experiment,
the rescaling coefficient a in (8.7) is set to 5, which downscales the appearance model
parameters of most images in both GAN training sets to the interval of [−1, 1].
1The CLNF facial landmark detector is provided by the OpenFace toolkit which is available on
https://github.com/TadasBaltrusaitis/OpenFace.
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8.4.2 Generating random faces with the AMGAN without condi-
tions
The experiment presented in this subsection has been conducted to test whether
the proposed AMGAN architecture could map the uniformly distributed noise
samples to the appearance model parameter distribution of real face images. As
mentioned, a subset of CelebA dataset was used as the training set in this experiment.
Both the generator and the discriminator are three-layer MLPs which include an
input layer, a hidden layer and an output layer. The size of the hidden layer in
both neural networks is 128. The Leaky ReLU activation function is used in the
hidden layer with α  0.2. The input and output layer sizes of the generator are
128 and 157; the input and output layer sizes of the discriminator are 157 and 1.
There is no activation function in the output layer of the generator, because the real
data is not completely constrained to [−1, 1]. The AMGAN has been trained with
LSGAN, WGAN andWGAN-GP loss functions, respectively. The learning rate of the
generator has been set to 10−3 and the learning rate of the discriminator 10−4. In each
iteration, the discriminator updates 2 times while the generator updates once. For
LSGAN and WGAN loss functions, the RMSProp method has been used to optimise
the networks. For WGAN-GP, the Adam optimisation method has been used, where
β1  0.5, β2  0.999 and the gradient penalty λ  1.
Fig. 8.2 compares the data distributions of real face images against those produced
by the trained G. The first row in Fig. 8.2 shows the distributions of the first two
dimensions of face shape parameters and the second row in Fig. 8.2 shows the
distributions of the first two face texture parameters. As shown in both figures, with
the same network architectures, loss functions LSGAN, WGAN and WGAN-GP can
all generate a data distribution that closely resembles the real data distribution. The
GAN models trained with all three loss functions can learn the bias and variance
in each dimension, e.g. the second dimension of shape parameters have a higher
variance than other dimensions as shown in Fig. 8.2. There was no mode collapse
observed from the results.
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Fig. 8.3 Example face images reconstructed from LSGAN generated appearance
model parameters. Each row illustrates the face images corresponding to a linear
interpolation between two random input noise samples.
Fig. 8.3 shows some face image examples reconstructed from themodel parameters
generated by the LSGAN model. Each row illustrates the face images corresponding
to a linear interpolation between two random input noise samples. On the one
hand, it shows that the generated faces have a high visual quality in the resolution
of 200 × 200. On the other hand, it shows that the continuous change in the noise
dimension has been mapped to the appearance model feature manifold.
8.4.3 Generating face images with attributes
The aim of this experiment is to exam the performance of the proposed AMGAN
with attribute control and select the more suitable model for the generation of an
identity pool. From the provided attribute labels, three common attributes have been
selected for CelebA and LFW datasets, namely male, youth and smiling. The images
from these two datasets were used to train the AMGANwith the three loss functions
described in Section 8.4.2. Both cGAN architecture and GAN with auxiliary loss
architecture are used for comparison. In the training phase, the network training
hyperparameters are specified in Section 8.4.2. In the test phase, every attribute
in c has been examined by linear interpolating the corresponding condition value
independently while setting the rest of the condition values to zero. The example
synthetic images are shown in Fig. 8.6–8.8 and the values in the noise vector z of all
the shown examples have been fixed to zero. Regardless of the loss functions and
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network architectures, all the GANs trained with the CelebA dataset have produced
expected results in the sense that the generated faces are associated with the same
identity while the facial attributes vary in correspondence with the given attribute
values. In contrast, as shown on the examples generated by a GAN trained on
the LFW dataset, the change of the attributes value can affect the identities of the
generated images. The output examples from the GAN trained with LFW data
indicate that the generator could not distinguish z and c well enough when being
given continuous labels. Furthermore, it is obvious that when the given attribute is
close to −1 or 1, the GANs trained with continuous labels may generate face images
with low visual quality.
Further investigation on the smiling attribute has been conducted and the
changing path of shape model parameters on third and fourth dimension when
smiling attribute changes from −1 to 1 are shown on Fig. 8.9 and 8.10. The third
dimension of shape parameters represents the positions of the corners of the mouth
and the fourth dimension of shape parameters represents the mouth openness
(see also Fig. 3.3). Because the CelebA dataset describes each face attribute with a
categorical label, the trained generator has estimated amore linear transition between
the attribute values −1 and 1. In contrast, the GANs trained with the LFW dataset
and its continuous labels, have shown a better understanding of the non-linear
transition of smiling embedded in the manifold. However, the learned smiling path
is not associated with one identity but across the dataset. Apart from the different
types of labels, the size of CelebA dataset is 15 times larger than the LFW dataset,
which means a GAN can learn a better estimation of the real face distribution.
All the generator trained with CelebA dataset can provide the expected results,
and themodel trainedwith LSGANusing cGANarchitecturewas selected to generate
the identity pool. More specifically, all the identity pool candidates were generated
and selected with the following conditions: (a) the smiling attribute value has been
set to −0.9; (b) the generated samples are selected only if the first two shape model
parameters is within one standard deviation of each dimension; and (c) the score of
the discriminator is higher than 0.6. Some face images from the constructed identity
pool are shown in Fig. 8.4.
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Fig. 8.4 Example images of the generated identity pool
8.4.4 Re-identification risks
The following experiment extends the re-identification risk test in Section 7.5.3 and
replace the manually selected identity pool with the GAN generated identity pool.
In addition, the state-of-the-art face recognition method is used in this experiment,
which uses the neural network learned features rather than handcrafted features.
The Inception-ResNet-v1 architecture [154] is used to extract the 128-dimensional
face features, and the network was trained on MS-Celeb-1M dataset [155] with centre
loss [106]. The trained model is provided by the facenet project.2
The re-identification risks are evaluated with the UNBC-McMaster dataset 10
times for different proportions of the generated identity pools. The mean ± standard
deviations of the risks are shown in Fig. 8.5. Several conclusions can be drawn from
the results in Fig. 8.5. First of all, replacing the identity pool of real face images with
a GAN generated identity pool has a negligible impact on the privacy protection
performance of the face de-identification system. The results also show that the
re-identification risks are not sensitive to the size of the identity pool, which means
the lack of data does not limit the construction of the identity pool, and the identity
pool can have a dynamic range and be updated on-demand. Last but not least, the
state-of-the-art face recognition method yields a higher re-identification risk, the
re-identification risks of using FaceNet features are two times higher than using LBP
features.
8.5 Conclusions
With the aim to solve the lack of data problem, this chapter proposes the AMGAN to
generate face images. The AMGAN is a combination of appearance model and GAN.
It can be controlled to generate frontal neutral face images for face de-identification.
2https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
8.5 Conclusions 115
102 103 104
ID pool size
0
2
4
6
8
R
e-
id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n
ris
k
(%
)
FERET ID pool
k-Same-M
k-Diff-f
(a) LBP
102 103 104
ID pool size
0
2
4
6
8
R
e-
id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n
ris
k
(%
)
FERET ID pool
k-Same-M
k-Diff-f
(b) FaceNet
Fig. 8.5 Re-identification risks of UNBC-McMaster video frames de-identified with
GAN generated identity pool.
The proposed AMGAN trains a generator that can map a noise distribution to the
prior appearance model parameter distribution. Because the dimensionality of the
target data distribution is highly reduced, two shallow MLP networks are used in
the proposed AMGAN as the generator and the discriminator. The experiment
results show that the proposed AMGAN architecture can generate realistic-looking
face images and the facial attributes of the outputs can be controlled by adding
conditions as inputs to the generator. Finally, an identity pool was generated by the
proposed AMGAN and connected with the face de-identification system introduced
in Chapter 7. The re-identification risks show that the GAN generated identity
pool provides a comparable privacy protection performance as the identity pool of
manually selected real images.
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8.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and future work
9.1 Summary
This thesis first introduced the k-Same-furthest face de-identification method which
includes the wrong-map protection to the k-Same-M face de-identification. It
showed as long as the dataset has a low variance on the expected data utility, the
de-identification method can replace the original face with the face having the largest
similarity distance to maximise the identity loss. The k-Same-furthest can provide
two safeguards against re-identification attacks:
1) Face recognition software tends to recognise the given identity as a wrong
identity;
2) At least k identities sharing the same copy of the de-identified face in a dataset
guarantees a re-identification risk of at most 1/k.
Based on the k-Same-furthest face de-identification, data utility in different
application scenarios has been discussed. Data utility was considered in two aspects,
the dataset-wise data utility (e.g. the data distribution within a data set) and the
individual-wise data utility (e.g. the expression on an individual face). The k-Same
family uses an identical face image to replace a group of faces which destroys
the statistical characteristic of the original dataset. This thesis attempts to answer
the question that could we generate a de-identified face dataset that has a similar data
distribution to the original? To this end, the k-Diff-furthest and the AMGAN methods
were proposed. Both methods synthesis non-exist face images using face appearance
model.
The k-Diff-furthest was modified from k-Same-furthest and the microaggregation
step in the k-Same-furthest was removed. It can provide wrong-map protection
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meanwhile maintains the diversity of the dataset and the relative position of a face
feature in its neighbourhood. The proposed AMGAN is a combination of appearance
model and GAN. The generator in the AMGAN was trained to generate appearance
model parameters that have the same distribution as a real face dataset. It has
been discussed in Chapter 8 that the generated face images can be controlled with
given conditions (face attributes). This was adopted to generate the identity pool for
face de-identification. The re-identification risks show that the AMGAN generated
identity pool provides a comparable privacy protection performance as the identity
pool of manually selected real images.
The face de-identificationmethodswere proposed for face datasets, while the data
utility of individual face image was also discussed in this thesis. Preserving facial
expression, the most important non-identity information in the face images, was
discussed in this thesis and a FET process was introduced to the face de-identification
system to preserve facial motions and expressions. The proposed FET can map
the dynamic changes on the original faces to the de-identified faces so that not
only the categories of the facial expression but also the intensities of the facial
AUs can be preserved. It is an additional step to a face de-identification method,
and the experimental results showed that the FET has a negligible impact on the
re-identification risk.
The transfer manner in FET can help extend the face de-identification methods
that have been designed for the image set to video data. The concept of identity
pool has been introduced to design the face de-identification system for open-set
scenario. Chapter 7 showed an efficient manner that can transfer the knowledge of a
de-identified face dataset to open-set data through an identity shift process.
The proposed background merging process for face de-identification can blend
the de-identified face image with its original background seamlessly and maintain
the de-identified face shapes. It increases the visual quality of the de-identified face
images in terms of fidelity and intelligibility.
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9.2 Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to investigate the face de-identification methods that
can eliminate the identifying information while preserving the usability of the face
image/video data. The proposed face de-identification system attempted to generate
images with high visual qualities which is intelligible to both human and computer
vision system. In this proposed system, the frontal neutral faces were used as identity
references, and the system firstly removes the personally identifying information
from the target images then add the original data utility information back to the
target images. The preservation of data utility was considered in different application
scenarios, and this thesis showed the trade-off between re-identification risk and
data utility. Each method for face de-identification described in this thesis has its
advantages and disadvantages.
• The k-Same/Diff-furthest face de-identification methods provide wrong-map
protection which can reduce the re-identification risk to near zero. However,
these two methods require low data utility variance in the target face dataset.
• Additionally, it is a double-edged sword that the k-Diff-furthest method
generates de-identified face images without face image aggregation. The de-
identified face dataset maintains the diversity of the original dataset and some
local relationships among data subjects. Such information can support tasks,
e.g. face tracking and kinship recognition. However, the retaining information
could also help an attacker restore an original face from a de-identified face.
• The background merging method helps to generate high visual quality de-
identified face images in terms of fidelity and intelligibility. The image blending
method restores the low-frequency information from the original image which
can increase the re-identification risk. Experimental results reveal that the image
de-identification need to attach importance to image background, although the
image background deformation method can help to reduce the re-identification
risk from the image background.
• The FET method maps the facial expressions from the original face to de-
identified faces not only in categorical level but also in intensity level. This
method was used to remedy the data utility protection limitations on k-
Same/Diff-furthest face de-identification methods. However, the process of
FET does not satisfy the k-anonymity protection or wrong-map protection.
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• The method proposed for face de-identification in videos can de-identify video
sequence efficiently by using identity shift. The identity shift only need be
calculated once at the first frame for each video or each data subject, and it
can guarantee the identity consistency of the de-identified videos. However,
it requires the face region and facial landmarks can be fully detected in each
frame.
• The AMGAN was proposed to generate frontal neutral face images for face
de-identification. The AMGAN learns the distribution of the appearancemodel
feature space instead of image pixel space. It highly reduces the computational
complexity and power to synthesise high-quality face images by using two
shallow MLPs. However, because the appearance model reconstructs the
output images, synthesised face images are limited to these faces which can be
represented by the appearance model.
9.3 Future work
While with the work presented in this thesis, privacy preservation performance of the
face de-identification system has been improved and solutions have been proposed
for different application scenarios regarding the preservation of face-related data
utility. There are several unsolved problems to be addressed in future work.
A face de-identification method is not competent without extracting usable
information from a face image. It needs accurate face detection and face feature
extraction. These are sharing tasks and challenges with face recognition. Research
in these areas has developed rapidly in recent years. Integrating the state-of-the-art
face recognition techniques to face de-identification can help face de-identification
generate promising results.
In this thesis, the face images are de-identified in appearance model feature space.
The appearance model is a PCA based model and it provides reliable statistical
features. It is a linear model and provides an easy way to extract features and
reconstruct data through Eigenvectors. Some semantic information has been found
in the feature space of the current model, e.g. the global illumination, head poses
and mouth openness, but they are limited. A more powerful semantic face model
through supervised learning can help the face de-identification system maintain
data utility more precisely.
In terms of increasing the visual quality, a 3D face model can be considered.
There are more 3D face data publicly available and the cost of graphics rendering
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has reduced. Furthermore, the knowledge of anatomies such as skull and facial
musculature model can be adopted in reconstructing a face physically.
In Chapter 6, the re-identification results show that the proposed face de-
identification method provides high privacy protection within the face region.
However, blending the de-identified face to its original background increases the
re-identification risk noticeably. Although a face recognition software focuses on the
cropped face region, the information contained in the background area around a
face region (e.g. hair colour, hairstyle, and dressing style) also contribute to the iden-
tification of a person. Experimental results of the re-identification attack using only
the background information confirmed that face region in an image is sufficient but
not necessary for identifying a person. Face region information is the most efficient
information to facilitate face recognition. However, only de-identify this information
cannot stop the attacker from establishing re-identification using other information
such as the background. If the problem is not constrained in preserving privacy in
face region but preserving the privacy of an image with faces in, de-identification
must be applied to not only the face region but also all the image regions that contain
personally identifiable information.
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